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Colin P. Marks*
Abstract
Online retail is a multi-billion-dollar industry in the United States.
Consumers enjoy the ease with which they can browse, click, and order
goods from the comfort of their own homes. Though it may come as no sur-
prise to most lawyers, retailers are taking advantage of online transactions
by attaching additional terms and conditions that one would not normally
find in-store. Some of these conditions are logical limitations on the use of
the retailers' websites, but others go much further, limiting consumers'
rights in ways that would surprise many shoppers. In particular, many
online retailers use these terms to limit implied warranties, sell goods "as
is, " limit remedies, and add a host of other limitations. This article does not
discuss the effects of online terms and conditions, but rather explores a very
basic question: How prevalent are certain terms and conditions? While
these terms and conditions might seem to be ever-present in online transac-
tions, there have been few attempts thus far to empirically record the fre-
quency of their use in retail transactions involving goods. This article reme-
dies the situation by exploring the mode by which consumers assent, the
prevalence of warranty and liability limitation clauses, and the prevalence
of other common clauses used by the largest retailers in the United States.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Online shopping has grown to become the preferred method of buying
goods for much of the American public.' In 2015 alone, an estimated $342
billion was spent buying goods online. 2 The ease with which consumers can
browse and pay for goods is no doubt a primary reason for the popularity of
online shopping, but this modem technological convenience comes with a cost
1. See Rebecca DeNale & Deanna Weidenhamer, U.S. Census Bureau, Press Release, Quarterly
Retail E-Commerce Sales, 4th Quarter 2015, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEwS 1 (Feb. 17, 2016, 10:00
AM), https://www2.census.gov/retail/releases/historical/ecomm/1 5q4.pdf.
2. Id.
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to which most consumers do not pay attention-terms and conditions.3
It will come as no surprise to most lawyers that retailers are taking ad-
vantage of online transactions by attaching additional terms and conditions
that consumers would not normally find in-store.4 Some of these conditions
are logical limitations on the use of retailers' websites, but others go much
further, limiting consumers' rights in a way that would surprise many shop-
pers.5 In particular, many online retailers use these terms to limit implied
warranties, sell goods "as is," limit remedies, and add a host of other limita-
tions.
6
Many commentators have criticized the use of such online terms, arguing
that the terms impose undue burdens on consumers, who do not truly consent
to them. Others defend such use as simply the market at work.8 Even if most
consumers do not read the terms and conditions, the egregious ones will even-
tually come to light through social media and other outlets.9 The argument
goes that if consumers find such terms undesirable, they will shop else-
where.'0 This article does not discuss the effects of online terms and condi-
tions, but rather explores a very basic question: How prevalent are such terms
3. See infra note 24-33 and accompanying text.
4. See infra Section III.C.
5. See infra Section III.C.
6. See infra Section III.C.
7. See, e.g., Paul J. Morrow, Cyberlaw: The Unconscionability / Unenforceability of Contracts
(Shrink-wrap, Clickwrap, and Browse-wrap) on the Internet: A Multijurisdictional Analysis Showing
the Need for Oversight, 11 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1, 28 (2011) (criticizing browsewrap and click-
wrap agreements and arguing for a return to "a rational common law system" of contract law, in which
no contract arises without mutual assent between the parties). For a discussion on mandatory disclo-
sure and the negative effects on consumers, see generally Oni Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The
Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011).
8. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Con-
sumer Markets, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 3, 5 (Omri Ben-Shahar
ed. 2007) (suggesting that one-sided contracts even the playing field between sellers with a "sunk
cost" in reputation and non-repeat buyers with "no sunk cost in reputation" and, therefore, no incentive
to "deal fairly with the seller"); see also IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union,
512 F.3d 989, 993 (7th Cir. 2008) (Easterbrook, C.J.) ("As long as the market is competitive, sellers
must adopt terms that buyers find acceptable; onerous terms just lead to lower prices. If buyers prefer
juries, then an agreement waiving a jury comes with a lower price to compensate buyers for the
loss.... As long as the price is negotiable and the customer may shop elsewhere, consumer protection
comes from competition rather than judicial intervention." (citations omitted)).
9. See, e.g., Seth Stevenson, By Clicking on This Article, You Agree to..., SLATE (Nov. 17, 2014,
7:00 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2014/1 /end user license agreeme
nts does it matter that we don t read the fineprint.html (discussing Pinterest's terms and
conditions).
10. See Oni Ben-Shahar, Regulation Through Boilerplate: An Apologia, 112 MICH. L. REV. 883,
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and conditions?"
While these terms and conditions may seem to be ever-present in online
transactions, there have been few attempts thus far to empirically record the
frequency of their use in retail transactions involving goods. 12 This article
remedies the situation by exploring the ways in which consumers assent, the
prevalence of warranty and liability limitation clauses, and the prevalence of
other common clauses used by the largest retailers in the United States.' 3 Part
II provides an overview of contract formation in the online context; discusses
online warranties, remedies, and limitations on them under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (U.C.C.); and concludes with a brief review of other clauses that
make their way into online terms and conditions.' 4 Part III explores how re-
tailers are attempting to bind consumers and discusses the prevalence of cer-
tain standard clauses, broken down by industry.15 Part IV then briefly reflects
upon the effect such clauses have on consumers.' 6
891 (2014) (suggesting that, despite consumers' "state of ignorance" concerning transaction terms,
consumers "can and often do [make satisfying choices] ... by relying on various cues: advice, ratings,
indexes, reputation, and their own experience"); see also IFC Credit Corp., 512 F.3d at 993. But see
Nancy Kim, Clicking and Cringing, 86 OR. L. REv. 797, 825 n.90 (2008) ("To the claim that standard
form contracts are unconscionable, it is often the response that consumers are free to shop elsewhere
for better terms. In reality, consumers are unlikely to compare several different multipage agreements
for reasons exhaustively discussed elsewhere."). For an alternate view of online contracting, including
an argument that consideration is key to determining legitimacy, and review of the decline of consumer
regard for contracts as a direct result of their ubiquity, see generally Nancy S. Kim, Contract's Adap-
tation and the Online Bargain, 79 U. CIN. L. REv. 1327,1369 (2011), which notes, among otherthings,
that "[t]he contracting of everything has conditioned society not to take seriously the contracting of
anything."
11. See infra Section II.C.1.
12. One notable exception is a 2008 essay appearing in the Columbia Law Review, which studied
the top 500 online retailers, but was not limited to retailers selling goods. See Ronald J. Mann &
Travis Siebeneicher, Just One Click: The Reality of Internet Retail Contracting, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
984, 993-98 (2008) (explaining the parameters of the dataset); see also Robert A. Hillman & Ibrahim
Barakat, Warranties and Disclaimers in the Electronic Age, 11 YALE JL. & TECH. 1, 5 (2009) (limit-
ing its dataset to software sales).
13. See infra Parts 11-111.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
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II. CONTRACT FORMATION IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE
A. How Consumers Bind Themselves to Online Terms and Conditions
When a consumer walks into a brick-and-mortar retail store and buys a
good, the law typically presumes that the advertised price is merely a solici-
tation. 17 It is the consumer who makes the offer to buy the good at the adver-
tised price when he or she brings the good to the check-out clerk.' 8 Once
payment is tendered, the sale is complete.' 9 However, a number of courts
have broken from this model and, under what is known as a "rolling con-
tract,"20 held that additional terms and conditions, located inside the good's
packaging and unseen by consumers, can still be binding. 2' Under this theory,
it is the vendor who makes the offer by presenting the terms and conditions-
17. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("Advertise-
ments of goods by display, sign, handbill, newspaper, radio or television are not ordinarily intended
or understood as offers to sell."); 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 2.4 (Joseph M.
Perillo ed., Mathew Bender & Co. rev. ed. 2013) ("Usually, neither the advertiser nor the reader of the
notice understands that the reader is empowered to close the deal without further expression by the
advertiser. Such advertisements are understood to be mere requests to consider and examine and ne-
gotiate; and no one can reasonably regard them otherwise unless the circumstances are exceptional
and the words used are very plain and clear."); see also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Russell, 519 N.W.2d
460, 463 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) ("Generally, if goods are advertised for sale at a certain price, it is not
an offer and no contract is formed; such an advertisement is merely an invitation to bargain rather than
an offer.").
18. See Klocekv. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332,1340 (D. Kan. 2000) ("In typical consumer
transactions, the purchaser is the offeror, and the vendor is the offeree."); U.C.C. § 2-206(1) (AM.
LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2012) ("Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language
or circumstances[,] ... an offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any
manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances.").
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("The manifesta-
tion of assent may be made wholly or partly by written or spoken words or by other acts or by failure
to act."); see also ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[A] contract can
be, and often is, formed simply by paying the price and walking out of the store.").
20. See Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679, 681
("[Rolling contracts] essentially permit parties to reach agreement over basic terms, such as price and
quantity, but leave until a later time, usually simultaneous with the delivery or first use of the goods,
the presentation of additional terms that the buyer can accept, often by simply using the good, or reject,
by returning it.").
21. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148-50 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing ProCD
and holding that the terms included in a computer's packaging were accepted by the consumer when
the consumer kept and used the computer beyond the specified thirty-day return period); ProCD, 86
F.3d at 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) ("A vendor, as master of the offer, may invite acceptance by conduct, and
may propose limitations on the kind of conduct that constitutes acceptance. A buyer may accept by
performing the acts the vendor proposes to treat as acceptance.").
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such as warranties and arbitration clauses-in the box, to which the consumer
may accept by keeping the good, or reject by returning it.22 Not all courts
agree with this approach, however, and many commentators have criticized
it.
23
Online transactions largely avoid this scenario, because vendors can make
their terms and conditions available before transactions are consummated.24
The duty to read assumes that parties to a contract have read and understood
the terms and conditions in the contract.25 This is a bedrock principle of the
objective theory of contract formation and is applied no differently in elec-
tronic contracts.26 However, before the duty to read arises, the parties must
22. See ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1452 ("ProCD proposed a contract that a buyer would accept by
using the software after having an opportunity to read the license at leisure.... [T]he UCC permits
contracts to be formed in [various] ways."); Eric A. Posner, Essay, ProCD v. Zeidenberg and Cognitive
Overload in Contractual Bargaining, 77 U. CI. L. REv. 1181, 1184 ("In fact, according to Judge
Easterbrook, acceptance did not take place until Zeidenberg used the software. The reason is that the
'offer' was not 'you may have the product if you pay now,' but 'you may have the product if you pay
now and use it later."').
23. See, e.g., Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1339 ("The Court is not persuaded that Kansas or Missouri
courts would follow the Seventh Circuit reasoning in Hill and Pro CD. In each case the Seventh Circuit
concluded without support that UCC § 2-207 was irrelevant because the cases involved only one writ-
ten form. This conclusion is not supported by the statute or by Kansas or Missouri law." (citations
omitted)); see also Nancy S. Kim, Situational Duress and the Aberrance of Electronic Contracts, 89
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 265, 282 (2014) ("In the 'rolling contract' situation, the consumer has already
purchased the product and the payment of money creates an expectation and ownership interest. The
company's act of imposing additional terms after purchase is even more unreasonable and wrongful
when one considers the sheer volume of subsequent terms. A study conducted by Professor James
Gibson found that buying a computer required 'agreeing' to an average of 25 binding contracts totaling
74,897 contractual terms, the majority of which were available only after purchase.").
24. See Provencher v. Dell, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1198-99 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (providing an
example of an online order from 2001 in which "[t]he Agreement was available for [the consumer's]
review ... before, while, and after" the purchase).
25. See Rossi v. Douglas, 100 A.2d 3, 7 (Md. 1953) (binding a party to a contract in a case where
the party "reads it, or, without reading it or having it read to him, signs it"); Ian Ayres & Alan
Schwartz, The No-ReadingProblem in Consumer ContractLaw, 66 STAN. L. REv. 545, 548-49 (2014)
("Contract law addresses the no-reading problem with the duty to read doctrine. Under this doctrine,
parties are taken to agree to terms that they had the opportunity to read before signing. The doctrine
'creates a conclusive presumption, except as against fraud, that the signer read, understood, and as-
sented to [the] terms."' (alteration and emphasis in original) (quoting Fivey v. Pa. R., 52 A. 472, 473
(N.J. 1902))).
26. See Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 25, at 549 ("The [duty-to-read] presumption has long been
justified as a necessary attribute of contracting regimes grounded in both efficiency and equity. For
example, in Lewis v. Great Western Railway, the Court of Exchequer unanimously rejected counsel's
argument that the plaintiff should not be bound to unread terms of the contract: 'It would be absurd to
say that this document, which is partly in writing and partly in print, and which was filled up, signed,
and made sensible by the plaintiff, was not binding upon him."' (quoting Lewis v. Great W. Ry.,
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be aware of the existence of the terms and conditions.27 This is not to say that
the parties must actually read the terms, but only that they must be made aware
of them so as to be put on "inquiry notice., 28 In the world of online contracts,
the key question is whether the design of the website puts the purchaser on
reasonable notice that the terms exist. 29 The most typical way in which retail-
ers make consumers aware of terms and conditions is through "browsewrap"
agreements. 30  Browsewrap agreements are website notices indicating that,
"by merely using the services of, obtaining information from, or initiating ap-
plications within the website-the user is agreeing to and is bound by the
site's terms of service.",31 Browsewrap agreements tend to be passive in na-
ture, as there is no need to acknowledge the agreement by clicking separately
before continuing with a purchase. 32 Links to the underlying terms and con-
ditions are not always easy to find, however, and thus many such links have
been attacked as not giving consumers fair notice of their existence.33
(1860) 157 Eng. Rep. 1427 (L.R. Exch.) 1430 (Bramwell B.); 5 H. & N. 867, 874)).
27. See Hirsch v. Citibank, N.A., 542 Fed. App'x. 35, 37 (2d Cir. 2013) ("While ji]t is true that a
party cannot avoid the terms of a contract on the ground that he or she failed to read it before signing[,]
... [a]n exception to this general rule exists when the writing does not appear to be a contract and the
terms are not called to the attention of the recipient. In such a case no contract is formed with respect
to the undisclosed term[s]."' (first three alterations in original) (quoting Spechtv. Netscape Commc'ns
Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 30 (2d Cir. 2002))); Schnabelv. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2012)
(opining that the "duty to read" as applied to "terms delivered after a contracting relationship has been
initiated do not nullify the requirement that a consumer be on notice of the existence of a term before
he or she can be legally held to have assented to it"); see also Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763
F.3d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 2014) ("[T]he validity of the browsewrap agreement turns on whether the
website puts a reasonably prudent user on inquiry notice of the terms of the contract." (citing Specht,
306 F.3d at 30-31)); Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 393-94 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (identifying,
as a general principal, that online terms of use are only enforceable if evidence is produced establishing
that the buyer had notice of the terms).
28. See Specht, 306 F.3d at 30 n.14 (2d Cir. 2002) ("'Inquiry notice' is 'actual notice of circum-
stances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry."' (quoting Cal. State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins.
Bureau v. Barrett Garages, Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 699, 703 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967))).
29. See Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029, 1034 (7th Cir. 2016) ("[W]e might ask
whether the web pages presented to the consumer adequately communicate all the terms and condi-
tions of the agreement, and whether the circumstances support the assumption that the purchaser re-
ceives reasonable notice of those terms.").
30. See Mann & Siebeneicher, supra note 12, at 998 (finding, in an empirical study of 500 online
vendors, that 88% used browsewrap).
31. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 462 n.22 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
32. See Berkson, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 395 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting the "passive nature" of browse-
wrap agreements); see also Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 25, at 548 (defining browsewrap as that
which allows "buyers to purchase without seeing a prominent hyperlink to the underlying terms").
33. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2014) ("[W]here
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Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp. provides an oft-cited example
of how a website's presentation of a contract's online terms and conditions
can fail to put a reasonable consumer on inquiry notice.34 In Specht, plaintiffs
downloaded "free" software from Netscape's website. 35 Unbeknownst to the
plaintiffs, the software transmitted to Netscape "private information about
plaintiffs' downloading of files from the Internet., 36 The plaintiffs sued for
violations of the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.37 Netscape moved to compel arbitration,
claiming that the plaintiffs agreed to the terms of the license agreement when
they downloaded the software and that one of those terms included an arbitra-
tion provision. 38 The plaintiffs claimed that they should not be bound by the
license agreement, as it was not located near the "download" button on the
visible screen, but rather in text that was visible only if they scrolled down the
webpage.39
The district court agreed with the plaintiffs, and Netscape appealed.40 On
appeal, the Second Circuit refused to enforce the arbitration provision. 41 Re-
lying upon the "reasonably prudent offeree" standard, the court held that, due
to the fact that the hyperlink was submerged on the webpage, the plaintiffs
were not put on constructive notice of the license's terms. 42 The court sum-
marized its holding, stating:
We conclude that in circumstances such as these, where consumers
are urged to download free software at the immediate click of a but-
ton, a reference to the existence of license terms on a submerged
screen is not sufficient to place consumers on inquiry or constructive
notice of those terms. The SmartDownload webpage screen "was
a website makes its terms of use available via a conspicuous hyperlink on every page of the website
but otherwise provides no notice to users nor prompts them to take any affirmative action to demon-
strate assent, even close proximity of the hyperlink to relevant buttons users might click on-without
more-is insufficient to give rise to constructive notice.").
34. Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 32 (2d Cir. 2002).





40. Id. at 25.
41. Id. at 40.
42. Id. at 30-32.
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printed in such a manner that it tended to conceal the fact that it was
an express acceptance of [Netscape's] rules and regulations." Inter-
net users may have, as defendants put it, "as much time as they
need[]" to scroll through multiple screens on a webpage, but there is
no reason to assume that viewers will scroll down to subsequent
screens simply because screens are there. When products are "free"
and users are invited to download them in the absence of reasonably
conspicuous notice that they are about to bind themselves to contract
terms, the transactional circumstances cannot be fully analogized to
those in the paper world of arm's-length bargaining.4 3
The court went on to distinguish other cases in which online terms and condi-
tions were enforceable, noting that, in those cases, "there was much clearer
notice ... that a user's act would manifest assent to contract terms.,
44
The primary problem with the browsewrap hyperlink in Specht was that
it was submerged below the viewable screen from which a consumer could
download the software.4 5 Other courts have similarly held that submerged
terms are not binding.4 6 However, even viewable browsewrap terms have
been held unenforceable when the hyperlinks are inconspicuous 47 or fail to
43. Id. at 32 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Larrus v. First
Nat'l Bank, 266 P.2d 143, 147 (1954)).
44. Id. at 33.
45. See id. at 32 (concluding that, because the plaintiffs could not reasonably have known about
the license terms contained on the submerged screen, there was no manifestation of assent).
46. See, e.g., Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding
that submerged terms did not provide sufficient notice, since the consumer was required to scroll to
the bottom of the screen-an action not required to complete the purchase-to view the terms and
conditions), aff'd, 380 F. App'x 22 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Cheryl B. Preston, "Please Note: You
Have Waived Everything": Can Notice Redeem Online Contracts.?, 64 AM. U. L. REv. 535, 547 n.60
(2015) (citing cases).
47. See Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 396 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (calling attention to
prominence as a requirement for putting consumers on notice of browsewrap terms and conditions,
and listing numerous district court and appellate cases holding that such terms are invalid if they are
inconspicuous); Long v. Provide Commerce, Inc., 200 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117, 126 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016)
(describing the browsewrap terms at issue as "simply too inconspicuous to meet [the Specht] stand-
ard"). In fact, the Ninth Circuit has even held that conspicuous hyperlinks can be unenforceable. See
Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2014) ("[W]e therefore hold that
where a website makes its terms of use available via a conspicuous hyperlink on every page of the
website but otherwise provides no notice to users nor prompts them to take any affirmative action to
demonstrate assent, even close proximity of the hyperlink to relevant buttons users must click on-
without more-is insufficient to give rise to constructive notice.").
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put the consumer on notice that the purchase is subject to the terms and con-
ditions. 8 To avoid these deficiencies, some companies have taken steps to
make their terms and conditions more conspicuous through what have been
referred to as "clickwrap," "scrollwrap," and "sign-in wrap" agreements. 9
While browsewrap agreements do not require that website users explicitly
assent to terms and conditions, clickwrap agreements require user action.
50
"By requiring a physical manifestation of assent, a user is said to be put on
inquiry notice of the terms assented to.,,51 The typical clickwrap agreement
comes in the form of a box that users must check before proceeding. 52 By
checking the box, the user agrees that he or she has read the terms and condi-
tions and is bound by them.53 A further variation of the clickwrap agreement
is the scrollwrap agreement.54 While clickwrap agreements require that users
48. See Lee v. Intelius Inc., 737 F.3d 1254, 126162 (9th Cir. 2013) (upholding a trial court's
denial of a request to compel arbitration because the defendant failed to provide adequate notice of the
arbitration clause to the consumer); Berkson, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 395 ("For an internet browsewrap
contract to be binding, consumers must have reasonable notice of a company's 'terms of use' and
exhibit 'unambiguous assent' to those terms.") (citing Specht, 306 F.3d at 35).
49. See generally Berkson, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 394-99 (outlining the four different types of online
consumer contracts and their respective modes for notifying consumers of terms and conditions). For
a discussion on which types of agreements are more likely to be enforced and what companies should
do to ensure their agreements are enforced, see Erin Canino, The Electronic "Sign-In Wrap" Contract:
Issues of Notice and Assent, the Average Internet User Standard, and Unconscionability, 50 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 535, 539 (2016); Adam Ruttenberg et al., New York District Court Articulates New
Testfor Assessing the Validity and Enforceability of Online Agreements, LEXOLOGY (July 14, 2015),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-60ab5224-0664-44 18-a4ee-2084b95a4ddb.
50. See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 462 n.22 (C.D. Cal. 2009) ("Clickwrap agreements
require a user to affirmatively click a box on the website acknowledging awareness of and agreement
to the terms of service before he or she is allowed to proceed with further utilization of the website.");
see also Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REv. 459, 466 (2006) (highlighting the activity
requirement of the "clickwrap" designation-clicking a box-and contending that "every court to con-
sider the issue has held clickwrap licenses enforceable").
51. Berkson, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 397; see Shacket v. Roger Smith Aircraft Sales, Inc., 651 F. Supp.
675, 690 (N.D. Ill. 1986) ("Inquiry notice exists where a person has knowledge of such facts as would
lead a fair and prudent person using ordinary care to make further inquiries. Where the person does
not take those added steps, he or she is chargeable with knowledge that would have been acquired
through diligent inquiry."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 19 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(focusing on the "intent" and "conduct" requirements of contractual assent).
52. See Ftejav. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (defining clickwrap as
that which requires the consumer to use a checkbox to indicate assent).
53. See id. at 837 (clarifying that clickwrap "requir[es] that the user manifest his or her assent to
the terms").
54. See generally Berkson, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 398 (distinguishing scrollwrap agreements, where "a
user must view [the terms] because of the nature of the website's construction and design" and click-
wrap agreements, where a user must "click an 'I agree' box that appears next to a hyperlink containing
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click a box, scrollwrap agreements force users to view the terms and condi-
tions as part of the website's construction and design. 55 This could come in
the form of a pop-up box containing the terms and conditions, with an "I
agree" button that users must click before proceeding. 56 Clickwrap and scroll-
wrap both require that consumers take an active step, and both are generally
viewed as being more enforceable than browsewrap agreements. 57 This is not
to say that using clickwraps or scrollwraps automatically shields such vendors
from reasonable notice arguments. 58 But case law suggests that these agree-
ments are generally enforceable.59
A fourth type of online agreement, which appears to be gaining popularity
among online vendors, is the sign-in wrap agreement. 60 Sign-in wrap agree-
ments are somewhat similar to browsewrap and clickwrap agreements. 61 Un-
like clickwrap agreements, however, sign-in wrap agreements do not require
that users click on a box to indicate acceptance of the terms of use before
continuing. 62 Instead, the website notifies users "of the existence and applica-
bility of the site's 'terms of use' when proceeding through the website's sign-
'terms of use'").
55. Id.
56. Id. at 398-99.
57. See Stacy-Ann Elvy, Contracting in the Age of the Internet of Things: Article 2 of the UCC
and Beyond, 44 HOFSTRA L. REv. 839, 873 n.200 (2016) ("Clickwrap agreements are also referred to
as click-through agreements. Scrollwrap agreements are another type of clickwrap agreement." (cita-
tions omitted)); see also Forrest v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1010-11 (D.C. 2002)
("The contract is entered into by the subscriber clicking an 'Accept' button below the scroll box....
Neither is the use of a 'scroll box' in the electronic version that displays only part of the Agreement
at any one time inimical to the provision of adequate notice.").
58. See Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029, 1036 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that because
the text accompanying the "I agree" button did not reference the defendant's Terms of Service, there
was no assent to those terms when the consumer clicked the button, and, as a result, the defendant
"undid whatever notice it might have been furnishing in the bold text block" contained in its Terms of
Service).
59. See Preston, supra note 46, at 544 ("Clickwrap agreements are the generally enforceable,
standard form contracts that Internet users assent to merely by clicking an 'I agree' option.").
60. See Seldenv. Airbnb, Inc., No. 16-CV-00933 (CRC), 2016 WL 6476934, at *4 (D.D.C. Nov.
1, 2016) ("[M]any internet websites-including Airbnb during the relevant time period-now use
'sign-in-wraps."').
61. See Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CV 14-14750-DPW, 2016 WL 3751652, at *6 (D.
Mass. July 11, 2016) ("In a sign-in wrap, a user is presented with a button or link to view terms of use.
It is usually not necessary to view the terms of use in order to use the web service....").
62. Id. ("[S]ign-in-wrap agreements do not have an 'I accept' box typical of clickwrap agreements.
Instead, sign-in-wrap agreements usually contain language to the effect that, by registering for an ac-
count, or signing into an account, the user agrees to the terms of service to which she could navigate
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in or checkout process."63 By giving such notifications, sign-in wrap agree-
ments are not only more explicit than the pure browsewrap, but also retain the
efficiency of the browsewrap in that they do not force users to take the extra
step of clicking a box before proceeding or navigating a pop-up screen.
64
Sign-in wrap can come in a couple of fonns.65 One form, which Amazon.com
requires, forces users to create an account and sign in before shopping.66 Al-
ternatively, sign-in wrap might simply have a notification next to the "check-
out" or "submit" button informing users that, by proceeding, they bind them-
selves to the retailer's terms and conditions.
67
B. A Primer on Warranty and Liability Limitation Clauses
The major focus of this article is to study the prevalence of online terms
and conditions in the sale of goods.68 Article 2 of the U.C.C. has provisions
regarding implied warranties and liability limitations that displace the com-
mon law.69 Therefore, a brief explanation of express and implied warranties,
applicable remedies, and limitations under the U.C.C. is in order.70
from the sign-in screen.").
63. Berksonv. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 399 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
64. Resorb Networks, Inc. v. YouNow.com, 30 N.Y.S.3d 506, 512 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016) (explain-
ing that although YouNow's website shares characteristics with clickwrap and browsewrap agree-
ments, it "could be characterized as a sign-in-wrap" because the user assents to the terms and condi-
tions during the sign-in process).
65. See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
66. Selden v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 16-CV-00933 (CRC), 2016 WL 6476934, at *4 (D.D.C. Nov. 1,
2016) ("'Sign-in-wrap' agreements are those in which a user signs up to use an internet product or
service, and the signup screen states that acceptance of a separate agreement is required before the
user can access the service. While a link to the separate agreement is provided, users are not required
to indicate that they have read the agreement's terms before signing up.").
67. Berkson, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 401 (describing typical qualities of an enforceable sign-in wrap
agreement).
68. See infra Part III.
69. See U.C.C. § 2-312 to -315 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2012); see also infra Sec-
tions II.B. 1-3.
70. See infra Sections II.B.1-3.
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1. Warranties
There are three warranties that are of primary concern to buyers of
goods71: express warranties, implied warranties of merchantability, 73 and
implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose.74 Express warranties
are governed by U.C.C. section 2-3 13(1), which provides that such warranties
are created by:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bar-
gain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the
affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of
the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform
to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bar-
gain creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall
conform to the sample or model.75
With regard to online sales, subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) are particularly rel-
evant.76 Subsection (1)(a) covers affirmative representations as to the quality
71. There is a fourth: the warranty of title and against infringement. See U.C.C. § 2-312 (1), (3).
This section provides:
(1) Subject to subsection (2) there is in a contract for sale a warranty by the seller that
(a) the title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer rightful; and
(b) the goods shall be delivered free from any security interest or other lien or encumbrance
of which the buyer at the time of contracting has no knowledge.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed a seller who is a merchant regularly dealing in goods of the
kind warrants that the goods shall be delivered free of the rightful claim of any third person
by way of infringement or the like but a buyer who furnishes specifications to the seller
must hold the seller harmless against any such claim which arises out of compliance with
the specifications.
Id. Because this section is rarely at issue in the transactions examined in my study, it is not addressed
in this paper.
72. Id. § 2-313.
73. Id. § 2-314.
74. Id. § 2-315.
75. Id. § 2-313(l).
76. See id.
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of the goods, as well as warranties and guarantees.77 Subsection (2) makes
clear, however, that use of the words "warranty" and "guarantee" is not nec-
essary, with the caveat that "an affirmation merely of the value of the goods
or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation
of the goods does not create a warranty., 78 Subsection (1)(b) covers descrip-
tion warranties, such as affirmative statements as to the type,79 dimensions, 80
and specifications8' of a particular good.82 Though paragraphs (a), (b), and
(c) of subsection (1) require that the affirmation, description, or sample be-
come the "basis of the bargain,"83 courts have traditionally presumed as much
and not required plaintiff buyers to show that they actually relied on the ex-
press warranty.84 Instead, sellers bear the burden of showing that an express
warranty was not the basis of the bargain.
8 5
In addition to possible express warranties, an implied warranty of mer-
chantability also attaches to every sale of goods by a merchant seller.86 U.C.C.
section 2-314 provides:
77. Id. § 2-313(1)(a).
78. Id. § 2-313(2).
79. See Select Pork, Inc. v. Babcock Swine, Inc., 640 F.2d 147, 149-50 (8th Cir. 1981) (upholding
a breach of express warranty claim based on the defendant's statement to the plaintiff that a pig was
of a certain type); R. Clinton Constr. Co. v. Bryant & Reaves, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 838, 845 (N.D. Miss.
1977) (permitting a claim for breach of express warranty where the product did not conform to the
seller's description of the product as a "good, first-class permanent type of antifreeze").
80. See Edward E. Gillen Co. v. City of Lake Forest, No. 91 C 183, 1991 WL 171945 at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 3, 1991) (recognizing the failure of a delivered product to conform to contractually specified
dimensions as a basis for breach of express warranty), aff'd, 3 F.3d 192 (7th Cir. 1993); Loris Stav-
rinidis, Ltd. v. Graphic Equip. World Wide, No. 79 Civ. 5001 (CBM), 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9797,
at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 1981) (affirming liability for breach of express warranty where an item sold
to a buyer did not conform to the dimensions listed in the contract).
81. See N. States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Indus., 777 F.2d 405, 412 (8th Cir. 1985) ("[A] separate
express warranty was created by the technical specifications."); Capital Equip. Enters., Inc. v. N. Pier
Terminal Co., 254 N.E.2d 542, 545 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) (affirming a jury verdict that found the de-
fendant liable for breach of express warranty where equipment did not conform to the seller specifi-
cations).
82. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(b).
83. Id. § 2-313(1)(a)-(c).
84. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMVERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 10-5, at 457-
58 (6th ed. 2010) (addressing the change from "reliance" in the Uniform Sales Act to "basis of the
bargain" in the U.C.C. and pointing to both the lack of import assigned to, and the equivocal nature
of, the phrase "basis of the bargain"); see also U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 3 (explaining that proof of reliance
is not required if the affirmation is part of a description).
85. See U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 3 (asserting that removing the affirmation from the bargain "requires
clear affirmative proof").
86. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
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(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if
the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this
section the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either
on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract descrip-
tion; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality
within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even
kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units
involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agree-
ment may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.
8 7
This implied warranty is closely tied to the tort of products liability88 and re-
quires that a plaintiff prove both that the good is not merchantable, as defined
in subsections (a)-(f), and that the failure to be merchantable proximately
caused the plaintiffs harm.89 A full review of each subsection is beyond the
scope of this article. By way of example, courts have held that animal feed
that made farm animals sick was not fit for its ordinary purpose90 and that a
87. U.C.C. § 2-314.
88. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 84, § 10-11, at 480-81 (explaining the implied warranty
of merchantability, including its elements and relationship to tort liability).
89. Id.
90. Duxbury v. Spex Feeds, Inc., 681 N.W.2d 380, 393 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
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shipment of lumber containing different kinds of plywood and warped ply-
wood was not of even kind and quality. 9
Finally, the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose could also
arise in a sale of goods, though this seems less likely in purely online transac-
tions. Section 2-315 provides that if a seller has reason to know of any par-
ticular purpose for which a buyer is purchasing goods, and the buyer relies on
the seller's skill or judgment in selecting the goods, then there is an implied
warranty "that the goods shall be fit for such purpose., 9 2 This implied war-
ranty breaks down into three elements: "(1) [t]he seller must have reason to
know the buyer's particular purpose[;] (2) [t]he seller must have reason to
know that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to furnish ap-
propriate goods[; and] (3) [t]he buyer must, in fact, rely upon the seller's skill
or judgment."93 Given that courts have held that actual communication be-
tween buyer and seller regarding the particular purpose need not occur, this
warranty could be available in purely online transactions.94 It is also possible
for a buyer to call a sales representative before purchasing a product online,
and thus liability could attach.
95
2. Buyer's Remedies
Remedies for a seller's breach of contract come in two basic varieties:
remedies for non-performance of the contract (as when a seller fails to deliver
91. Gulf Trading Corp. v. Nat'l Enters. of St. Croix, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 177, 182 (D.V.I. 1996).
92. U.C.C. § 2-315 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2012).
93. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 84, § 10-14, at 496; accordLealv. Holtvogt, 702 N.E.2d 1246,
1256 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
94. See In re Rust-OleumRestore Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 155 F. Supp. 3d 772,
802-03 (N.D. Ill. 2016) ("The buyer need not directly communicate the particular purpose to Rust-
Oleum as [a] buyer need not bring home to the seller actual knowledge of the particular purpose for
which the goods are intended or of his reliance on the seller's skill and judgment, if the circumstances
are such that the seller has reason to realize the purpose intended."' (alteration in original) (quoting
U.C.C. § 2-315 cmt. 1)).
95. See Yossi v. Shapiro, No. CV095031240S, 2010 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1678, *18-19 (Conn.
Super. Ct. July 1, 2010) (upholding misrepresentation claims in a case in which an online buyer subject
to online auction terms contacted the auction enterprise, before the purchase, to inquire about the au-
thenticity of a piece of art); Groover v. Ogunyemi, No. 2004-11-349, 2006 WL 2615151, at *1, *4
(Del. Ct. Com. P1. Sept. 5, 2006) (permitting claims to proceed where defendant's advertisement "on
E-Bay [contained] ... a telephone number, which [Plaintiff] testified calling"), aff'd, No. CIV.A.
06A10001JAP, 2009 WL 2415639 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 2009). Though neither plaintiff prevailed
on a U.C.C. section 2-315 claim specifically, these cases indicate that the possibility clearly exists.
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goods, or in a proper case of rejection or revocation of the goods)96 and rem-
edies for the product's failure to perform as advertised (such as breach of war-
ranty remedies). 97 In the former situation, the U.C.C. gives buyers essentially
two options. 98 Buyers can choose to "cover" by buying a reasonable substitute
and suing for the difference in price, 99 or they can choose the "market" meas-
ure of damages and recover the "difference between the market price at the
time when the buyer learned of the breach and the contract price. . . ."100 If a
buyer chooses to cover, however, the buyer is normally prohibited from also
seeking the "market" measure of damages. 10
Once a buyer accepts goods, the available remedies are governed by sec-
tion 2-714 of the U.C.C. 10 2 Subsection 2-714(2) provides, "[t]he measure of
damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and place of ac-
ceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would
have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show
proximate damages of a different amount."'0 3  This section is subject to
U.C.C. section 2-607, however, which requires that the buyer notify the seller
of the breach "within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have dis-
covered any breach," or be barred from recovery. 0 4 This requirement is
96. See John A. Sebert, Jr., Remedies Under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code: An
Agendafor Review, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 360, 364-80 (1981) (reviewing remedies for buyers and sellers
under the U.C.C. and describing arguments for and against market damages).
97. Id. at 365.
98. U.C.C. § 2-711 (providing, inter alia, that an aggrieved buyer may either seek "cover" damages
or recover under section 2-713 ("market" measure)).
99. Id. § 2-712.
100. Id. § 2-713.
101. See id. § 2-713 cmt. 5 ("The present section provides a remedy which is completely alternative
to cover under the preceding section and applies only when and to the extent that the buyer has not
covered."); see also Sebert, supra note 96, at 380-81 (noting that while there is room to debate whether
a buyer could seek the market measure after covering, "this interpretation runs counter to the general
objective of contract remedies and of the Code-to put the aggrieved party in as good a position, but
no better, than he would have been in had the contract been performed. The aggrieved party is fully
compensated by a recovery based upon the actual resale or cover price, and there is no justification for
increasing the breacher's damage liability merely because a hypothetical market price is different from
the actual resale or cover price.") (internal citations omitted); David Frisch, The Compensation Myth
and U. C. C. Section 2-713, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 173, 182-96 (2014) (discussing market and cover dam-
ages and challenging two assumptions underlying full compensation rhetoric).
102. U.C.C. § 2-714.
103. Id. § 2-714(2).
104. Id. § 2-607(3)(a).
[Vol. 45: 1, 2017] Online and 'As Is"
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
meant to encourage settlement and give sellers the opportunity to cure de-
fects.'
0 5
Importantly, in all of the above remedies sections, buyers are entitled to
incidental and consequential damages under section 2-715.106 Section 2-715
permits recovery of incidental damages such as "expenses reasonably incurred
in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of goods rightfully
rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in
connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to
the delay or other breach.' 1 7 Section 2-715 goes on to describe when conse-
quential damages may be recovered, differentiating injuries to persons or
property and pure economic harm.' 08 For the latter, a buyer may recover for
"any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which
the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not
reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise."i09 Thus, for pure economic
consequential damages, the buyer must show that the damages were either
generally or specifically foreseeable, and also must attempt to mitigate the
consequential damages if possible. 1 °i For injuries to persons or property, the
Code does away with any foreseeability or mitigation principle, but does re-
quire that the injuries be "proximately" caused by the breach of warranty."'
3. How to Limit Warranties and Remedies Under the U.C.C.
Given that an implied warranty of merchantability attaches to every mer-
chant sale of goods' 1 2 and that breach of this warranty can lead to consequen-
tial damages that are perhaps disproportionate to the value of the good itself,
it is understandable why many merchant sellers would seek to disclaim such
warranties and liability." 3 The U.C.C. explicitly permits such disclaimers,
105. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 84, § 12-10, at 564.
106. U.C.C. § 2-715; see id. §§ 2-712 to -713 (specifying that additional incidental and consequen-
tial damages might be available under section 2-715).
107. Id. § 2-715(1).
108. Id. § 2-715(2).
109. Id. § 2-715(2)(a).
110. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 84, § 11-4, at 528-30, 535.
111. Id. § 11-4, at 537; U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b).
112. U.C.C. § 2-314.
113. See Roy Ryden Anderson, Of Mack Trucks, RoadBugs, Gilmore and Danzig: Happy Birthday
Hadley v. Baxendale, 11 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REV. 431, 452-53,452 n.88 (2005).
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but with some limitations.
114
A merchant may disclaim both the implied warranty of merchantability
and the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose under section 2-316.115
Subsection (2) provides:
Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty
of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention mer-
chantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to ex-
clude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must
be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied
warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There
are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face
hereof."",16
This provision permits written disclaimers of merchantability, but only if
the disclaimer mentions merchantability and is conspicuous. 117 Disclaimers
of warranties of fitness must be in writing and must also be conspicuous, but
the Code does not specifically require mention of a particular word or phrase,
such as "warranty" or "fitness.""' 8  Though the Code blesses the phrase
"[t]here are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face
hereof,"' 9 this phrase would be insufficient to disclaim the warranty of mer-
chantability. 120 Therefore, typical disclaimers usually specifically mention
both implied warranties by name.
121
Subsection (2) requires that written disclaimers be "conspicuous. "122
This term is defined in section 1-201(b)(10) as follows:
114. U.C.C. § 2-316.
115. Id. Express warranties generally cannot be disclaimed. See id. § 2-316(1) ("[N]egation or
limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable."); James River Equip.
Co. v. Beadle Cty. Equip., Inc., 646 N.W.2d 265, 270 (S.D. 2002) (refusing to permit disclaimer of an
express warranty by use of an "as is" in contract).
116. U.C.C. § 2-316(2). Subsection (3) expands the manner in which these implied warranties may
be disclaimed by providing three alternative disclaimer methods. See discussion infra notes 127-31.
117. U.C.C. § 2-316 cmt. 3.
118. Id. § 2-316 cmt. 4.
119. Id. § 2-316(2).
120. Id. § 2-316 cmt. 3.
121. WHITE & SUMVERS, supra note 84, § 13-5, at 577-79.
122. U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
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(10) "Conspicuous", with reference to a term, means so written, dis-
played, or presented that a reasonable person against which it is to
operate ought to have noticed it. Whether a term is "conspicuous" or
not is a decision for the court. Conspicuous terms include the follow-
ing:
(A) a heading in capitals equal to or greater in size than the surround-
ing text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding text
of the same or lesser size; and
(B) language in the body of a record or display in larger type than the
surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to the surround-
ing text of the same size, or set off from surrounding text of the same
size by symbols or other marks that call attention to the language.
1 23
Though this section mentions specific ways in which a term can be made con-
spicuous-such as by using all capital letters in the heading-comment 10
makes clear that other methods may be sufficient and that "the test is whether
attention can reasonably be expected to be called to [the term].' 124 Despite
the language in section 1-201(b)(10), some courts have held that it is not
enough to simply capitalize headings or particular words such as "merchant-
ability" and "fitness for a particular purpose," as that does not draw attention
to the fact that the warranties are disclaimed. 1 25 In response, some sellers find
it prudent to print the entire disclaimer in bold-face capital letters.
1 26
Despite the specific language required under section 2-316(2), subsection
(3) provides several alternatives that can effectively disclaim implied warran-
ties. 127 Subsection (3)(a), which is the most relevant to online sales of goods,
provides: "[n]otwithstanding subsection (2)[,] unless the circumstances indi-
cate otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded by expressions like 'as is',
123. Id. § 1-201(b)(10).
124. Id. § 1-201 cmt. 10.
125. E.g., Int'l Harvester Co. v. Pike, 466 S.W.2d 901, 906-07 (Ark. 1971); Massey-Ferguson, Inc.
v. Utley, 439 S.W.2d 57, 58-59 (Ky. 1969).
126. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 84, § 13-5, at 581 & n.14 (citing Parsley v. Monaco Coach
Corp., 327 F. Supp. 2d 797 (W.D. Mich. 2004) (holding that the conspicuousness requirement was
satisfied where bold, capitalized, and contrasting print on the front of the contract referenced capital-
ized language on the back of the contract)) (noting sellers' attempts to satisfy the conspicuousness
requirement).
127. U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
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'with all faults' or other language which in common understanding calls the
buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is
no implied warranty., 128 This would appear to give merchant sellers some
leeway in fashioning general disclaimers, but courts have not always looked
kindly on what might otherwise appear to be sufficient language. 1 2' For in-
stance, simply excluding "all warranties express or implied" has been held
insufficient to effectively disclaim the implied warranties of merchantability
and fitness.130 Furthermore, many courts have required that "as is" clauses be
conspicuous, even though the U.C.C. does not expressly contain such a re-
quirement.131
A buyer's remedies may also be limited under section 2-719(1), which
provides that:
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section
and of the preceding section on liquidation and limitation of damages,
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in sub-
stitution for those provided in this Article and may limit or alter the
measure of damages recoverable under this Article, as by limiting the
buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repayment of the price or
to repair and replacement of non-conforming goods or parts; and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is
expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole rem-
edy.
1 32
128. Id. § 2-316(3)(a).
129. See infra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
130. Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d 585, 593 (8th Cir. 1964) ("[T]he [fitness] dis-
claimer may not be merely by use of the clause disclaiming 'all warranties express or implied.'"); see
Zicari v. Joseph Harris Co., 304 N.Y.S.2d 918, 921 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969) (rendering the following
language ineffective as applied to the implied warranty of merchantability: "[w]e make no other or
further warranty, express or implied").
131. WHITE & SUMMfERS, supra note 84, § 13-6, at 586 & n. 17 (citing Woodruff v. Clark Cty. Farm
Bureau Co-op. Ass'n, 286 N.E.2d 188, 195-96 (Ind. App. 1972) (requiring that an "as is" disclaimer
in the sale of chickens be conspicuous); Dallas Aerospace, Inc. v. CIS Air Corp., No. 00-CV-1657,
2002 WL 31453789, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2002) (confirming the validity of a bold face "as is"
disclaimer in the sale of an airplane engine), aff'd 352 F.3d 775 (2d Cir. 2003)).
132. U.C.C. § 2-719(1).
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Subsection (b)'s statement that the limited remedy "is optional unless [it] is
expressly agreed to be exclusive"' 33 has caused some courts to hold in favor
of buyers in cases in which sellers use sloppy language that does not clearly
indicate that a remedy is "exclusive."' 34 However, careful drafting should be
sufficient to circumvent this outcome. 13 5 Also, some courts have held that
remedy limitations must be conspicuous, though no such requirement is found
in the text of the Code.
136
Subsection (1) permits remedy limitations, subject to two statutory re-
strictions. 137 The first is that the exclusive or limited remedy cannot "fail of
its essential purpose. '"i38 Comment 1 clarifies that "it is of the very essence
of a sales contract that at least minimum adequate remedies be available," and
that where circumstances cause an otherwise fair clause "to deprive either
party of the substantial value of the bargain, it must give way to the general
remedy provisions of [Article 2].,, 139 The most typical scenario in which a
remedy limitation clause fails its essential purpose is where the seller fails to
effectively repair or replace a defective good in accordance with the limited
remedy within a reasonable time period (or sometimes at all), 4 ' or where the
133. Id. § 2-719(1)(b).
134. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Reid, 465 S.W.2d 80, 84-85 (Ark. 1971) (delineating application
of "exclusive" language between paragraphs despite clear intent for the language to apply to reme-
dies); Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co. v. Dravo Corp., 436 F. Supp. 262, 276 (D. Me. 1977) (focusing on
the U.C.C. requirement that contractual remedies be labeled and agreed to as exclusive if they are to
be upheld as such).
135. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 84, § 13-9, at 599-602 (suggesting methods to avoid the
assurance of exclusivity).
136. See Avenellv. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 324 N.E.2d 583, 587 (Ohio App. 1974) (construing
section 2-719 to include a requirement that exclusive remedy clauses be made conspicuous); see also
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(3)
(2012) ("[A] warrantor may not exclude or limit consequential damages for breach of any written or
implied warranty ... unless such exclusion or limitation conspicuously appears on the face of the
warranty."); Sorce v. Naperville Jeep Eagle, 722 N.E.2d 227, 235 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1999)
(clarifying that the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act permits the "exclusion of consequential damages"
if "the exclusion appears conspicuously on the face of the warranty"). But see Boone Valley Coop.
Processing Ass'n v. French Oil Mill Mach. Co., 383 F. Supp. 606, 612 (D.C. Iowa 1974) (applying
the unconscionability standard rather than the conspicuous standard to limitations of remedies
clauses).
137. See infra notes 138, 146 and accompanying text.
138. U.C.C. § 2-719(2).
139. Id. § 2-719 cmt. 1.
140. See Beal v. Gen. Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423, 426 (D. Del. 1973) (stripping a remedy
exclusion of its effect because the warrantor failed to timely correct the defect); Mercedes-Benz of N.
Am., Inc. v. Dickenson, 720 S.W.2d 844, 854 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (noting that the warranty failed
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buyer is unable to tender the goods for repair due to their complete destruc-
tion.14
Where an exclusive repair or replace clause fails its essential purpose,
authorities are split as to whether this entitles an aggrieved buyer to pursue
consequential as well as direct damages. 42 Some courts have held that the
validity of consequential damages limitations depends on the exclusive rem-
edy and, therefore, if the exclusive remedy fails, the buyer should have access
to all other remedies, including consequential damages. 43 Other courts, how-
ever, have held that consequential damages limitations should be viewed as
independent of exclusive remedies, and thus should continue to be barred.
44
for essential purpose when seller was unable to repair the good in a reasonable time); Nation Enters.,
Inc. v. Enersyst, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 1506, 1513-14 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (applying Texas law regarding
failure of remedy for essential purpose).
141. See Rudd Constr. Equip. Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 735 F.2d 974, 982 (6th Cir. 1984) ("[T]he
repair or replace' language of the contract failed of its essential purpose, especially since the defective
part was small, and the defect resulted in the immediate destruction of the entire tractor shovel.").
142. See Robert J. Williams, Getting What You Bargained For: How Courts Might Provide a Co-
herent Basis for Damages That Arise When Remedies Fail of Their Essential Purpose, 5 VA. L. &
BUS. REV. 131, 135 (2010).
143. See Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am., 902 F.2d 703, 709 (9th Cir. 1990) (up-
holding the district court's disregard of a contractual cap on consequential damages in a case where
the exclusive remedy had failed its essential purposes); Ragen Corp. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 912
F.2d 619, 625 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying Wisconsin law); Miss. Chem. Corp. v. Dresser-Rand Co., 287
F.3d 359, 36647 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying Mississippi law and permitting consequential damages
when a repair or replace remedy failed its essential purpose); Arabian Agric. Servs. Co. v. Chief Indus.,
Inc., 309 F.3d 479,485-86 (8th Cir. 2002) (applying Nebraska law); Webco Indus., Inc. v. Thermatool
Corp., 278 F.3d 1120, 1131 (10th Cir. 2002) (applying Michigan law); Soo Line R.R. v. Fruehauf
Corp., 547 F.2d 1365, 1373 (8th Cir.1977) (applying Minnesota law); Caudill Seed & Warehouse Co.
v. Prophet 21, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 826, 833 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (applying Pennsylvania law); Bishop
Logging Co. v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 455 S.E.2d 183, 190-93 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995); Krupp
PM Eng'g, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 146, 149 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); John Deere Co. v.
Hand, 319 N.W.2d 434, 437 (Neb. 1982) (concluding, in a suit between a farmer and a seller of farm
implements, that if "the seller is given a reasonable chance to correct defects and the equipment still
fails to function properly, the limited remedy ... [has] fail[ed] of its essential purpose," and the plain-
tiff may recover "provable consequential damages, even though specifically excluded by the written
warranty"); Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imps., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 357 (Minn. 1977) (permitting recovery
of incidental damages, despite a disclaimer, when an exclusive remedy failed of its essential purpose);
Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 265 N.W.2d 513, 526 (Wis. 1978); Clark v. Int'l Harvester Co., 581
P.2d 784, 802 (Idaho 1978); Ehlers v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 226 N.W.2d 157, 161 (S.D. 1975); see
also Williams, supra note 142, at 135 ("Most U.S. courts of appeals have determined that when a
remedy fails of its essential purpose, consequential damages may be awarded even if the parties had
bargained them away in the sales contract.").
144. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 435, 457-58 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (viewing consequential damage exclusion clauses as independent from failure of exclusive rem-
edy clauses); Waters v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 775 F.2d 587, 591 (4th Cir. 1985) (separating the
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Again, careful drafting could resolve this issue; a seller could add language
such as, "In no case shall the buyer be entitled to consequential damages, and
such limitation is independent of exclusive repair or replace remedy.' 45
Subsection (3) also provides that "[c]onsequential damages may be lim-
ited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable." 46
Given that section 2-302 empowers courts to refuse to enforce any uncon-
scionable clause or contract, 47 this provision would seem to add little to the
Code. 48 However, subsection (3) goes on to distinguish limitations on con-
sequential personal-injury damages from limitations on consequential com-
mercial-loss damages, clarifying that the former are prima facie unconscion-
able, whereas the latter are not. 149 Thus, subsection (3) does two things: first,
it explicitly authorizes contractual exclusions of consequential damages, un-
less the plaintiff first shows that the exclusion is unconscionable; second, it
shifts the burden to the seller only in a narrow class of cases involving con-
sumer goods and a limitation on personal injuries.
50
consequential damages exclusion from the exclusive remedy clause failure).
145. See Stephen R. Patton, Enforceability of Limitation of Liability Provisions, in COMMERCIAL
DAMAGES: A GUIDE TO REMEDIES IN BUSINESS LITIGATION ch. 9, 9.03 (Matthew Bender, 2016)
("Whether or not a consequential damage limitation fails when a limited remedy provision also fails
depends on a factual determination as to whether the consequential damage limitation is merely part
of the limited remedy or, instead, a separate and independent allocation of risk. Careful drafting may
avoid this factual question."); see also Coastal Modular Corp. v. Laminators, Inc., 635 F.2d 1102,
1107 (4th Cir. 1980) ("It is difficult to believe that a buyer in an equal bargaining position would
accede to accepting such liability [for consequential damages] for a defect caused by the seller. In the
absence of clear intention, we cannot interpret an agreement as creating such a partial remedy. Coastal
and Laminators could have specifically agreed to limit consequential damages, but they did not."
(emphasis added)); Richard W. Duesenberg, Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey: Sales and
Bulk Transfer, 37 BUS. LAW. 949, 962 (1982) (mentioning specificity of contract language as a way
to avoid consequential damage liability when sellers use remedy limitation language).
146. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (AM. LAW INST. &UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2012).
147. Id. § 2-302(1).
148. Compare id. § 2-719(3) ("Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the lim-
itation or exclusion is unconscionable."), with id. § 2-302(1) ("If the court as a matter of law finds the
contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the uncon-
scionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any un-
conscionable result.").
149. Id. § 2-719(3).
150. See WHITE & SUMMVERS, supra note 84, § 13-11 (explaining the two elements in detail).
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C. Other Common Terms and Conditions
This study includes a review of other clauses-beyond just warranty dis-
claimers and damage limitation clauses-that, even if not always common,
could nonetheless have an important impact on consumers' rights. 151 This
includes clauses that limit the statute of limitations, arbitration clauses, choice
of law provisions, forum selection clauses, class action waivers, jury waivers,
and nondisparagement clauses.1
52
The statute of limitations for causes of action under the U.C.C. is nor-
mally four years. 15 3  The four-year period generally commences when the
breach occurs, which, for a warranty, is usually on tender of delivery of the
goods. 154  Under section 2-725, however, parties may shorten this time pe-
riod.155 Section 2-725 provides that, "[b]y the original agreement the parties
may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not ex-
tend it. ' ' 1S 6 Clauses like this one are still subject to general contract defenses,
such as unconscionability. 
157
Arbitration clauses deserve special mention, as they are governed by the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and have been the subject of multiple Supreme
Court decisions. 15s Furthermore, these clauses frequently incorporate many
of the other clauses studied. 159 Take, for instance, the following arbitration
151. See infra Section III.B.
152. See infra Section III.B.
153. U.C.C. § 2-725(l).
154. See id. § 2-725(2).
155. Id. § 2-725(l).
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., Snyder v. Gallagher Truck Ctr., Inc., 453 N.Y.S.2d 826, 827-28 (App. Div. 1982)
(holding that section 2-275 applied, after considering whether an agreement to amend the time period
for claims was a result of fraud, duress, or misrepresentation); Capehart v. Heady, 23 Cal. Rptr. 851,
854 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962) (applying standards of reasonableness and undue advantage to amended
limitations in the contract); see also Gregory Crespi, Agreements to Alter the Limitation Period Im-
posed by U. C. C. Section 2-725: Some Overlooked Complications, 46 ST. MARY'S L.J. 199,207 (2015)
(questioning whether unconscionability, reasonableness, or public policy considerations should be ap-
plied to section 2-725, and providing a fuller analysis as to the window of negotiation that the statute
permits).
158. For a discussion on the history of the FAA and cases involving the Act's intent and scope, see
generally Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEx. L. REv. 265 (2015).
159. See id. at 282 (noting a variety of clauses, apart from class action waivers, that are typically
included in arbitration clauses, such as "(1) truncated statutes of limitations, (2) damage limitations,
(3) anti-injunction clauses, (4) fee-shifting provisions, (5) forum-selection clauses, and (6) non-coor-
dination agreements").
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clause found on Amazon.com:
DISPUTES
Any dispute or claim relating in any way to your use of any Amazon
Service, or to any products or services sold or distributed by Amazon
or through Amazon.com will be resolved by binding arbitration, ra-
ther than in court, except that you may assert claims in small claims
court if your claims qualify. The [FAA] and federal arbitration law
apply to this agreement.
There is no judge or jury in arbitration, and court review of an arbi-
tration award is limited. However, an arbitrator can award on an in-
dividual basis the same damages and relief as a court (including in-
junctive and declaratory relief or statutory damages), and must follow
the terms of these Conditions of Use as a court would.
We each agree that any dispute resolution proceedings will be con-
ducted only on an individual basis and not in a class, consolidated or
representative action. If for any reason a claim proceeds in court ra-
ther than in arbitration we each waive any right to a jury trial. We
also both agree that you or we may bring suit in court to enjoin in-
fringement or other misuse of intellectual property rights.
APPLICABLE LAW
By using any Amazon Service, you agree that the [FAA], applicable
federal law, and the laws of the state of Washington, without regard
to principles of conflict of laws, will govern these Conditions of Use
and any dispute of any sort that might arise between you and Ama-
zon. 1
60
This arbitration provision includes a jury waiver ("There is no judge or jury
in arbitration .... "), class action waiver ("We each agree that any dispute
resolution proceedings will be conducted only on an individual basis and not
160. Conditions of Use, AmAZON.COM (May 30, 2017), https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/custom
er/display.htmlref-footer cou?ie-UTF8&nodeld-508088 (emphasis omitted).
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in a class, consolidated or representative action."), and a choice of law provi-
sion ("[Y]ou agree that the [FAA], applicable federal law, and the laws of the
state of Washington, without regard to principles of conflict of laws, will gov-
ern these Conditions of Use and any dispute of any sort that might arise be-
tween you and Amazon."). 6 ' Many of the retailers studied made use of these
clauses, as well as forum selection clauses, without including arbitration pro-
visions, but the FAA creates a stronger presumption of enforceability when
they are part of an arbitration clause.
16 2
The Supreme Court has stated that, in passing the FAA, Congress in-
tended "to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements
... and to place arbitration agreements on the same footing as other con-
tracts." '63 Though these clauses are open to traditional contract defenses, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld arbitration provisions under the FAA. 64
For instance, in A T&TMobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court held the pres-
ence of a provision barring class actions in the arbitration proceeding could
not be the basis for an unconscionability ruling) 6 5 Likewise, in DIRECTV,
Inc. v. Imburgia, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Concepcion, declaring
state laws prohibiting class action waivers invalid as a result of preemption by
161. Id.
162. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626, 628 (1985)
("[A]s with any other contract, the parties' intentions control, but those intentions are generously con-
strued as to issues of arbitrability. There is no reason to depart from these guidelines where a party
bound by an arbitration agreement raises claims founded on statutory rights. Some time ago this Court
expressed 'hope for [the Act's] usefulness both in controversies based on statutes or on standards
otherwise created[.]..... By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the sub-
stantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial, forum. It trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity,
informality, and expedition of arbitration." (second alteration in original) (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 364
U.S. 427, 432 (1953)); Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 480 n.2 (5th Cir. 2002)
("Under this modem reading of the FAA, the presumption of enforceability 'is not diminished when
a party bound by an agreement raises a claim founded on statutory rights."' (quoting Shearson/Am.
Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987)); Leslie, supra note 158, at 280 ("[A]rbitration
agreements have become a safe harbor for otherwise unenforceable class action waivers. Absent the
judicial deference to the terms in arbitration agreements, class action waivers would not be protected
by Concepcion; the Discover Bank rule still invalidates class action waivers contained in contracts
without arbitration agreements." (footnote omitted)).
163. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89 (2000) (quoting Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991)).
164. See, e.g., Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2010) (holding that an em-
ployment agreement that delegates to an arbitrator the "exclusive authority to resolve any dispute re-
lating to the [Agreement's] enforceability" is a valid delegation under the FAA).
165. AT&T Mobility LLCv. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344-52 (2011).
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the FAA.'66
The last type of clause studied, nondisparagement clauses, may be of lim-
ited interest due to recently enacted federal legislation. 16 7 Generally speaking,
nondisparagement clauses restrict individuals from taking any action that neg-
atively impacts an organization, its reputation, products, services, manage-
ment, or employees.' 68 While nondisparagement clauses are usually found in
settlement agreements and employment contracts, they do sometimes find
their way into the terms and conditions in the sale of goods.'6 9 However, the
Consumer Review Fairness Act, which was signed into law during the final
days of 2016, prohibits companies from placing nondisparagement clauses in
their contracts or terms of service with consumers. 17  Nonetheless, because
this study was completed before passage of the Act, coding was conducted to
review the frequency with which these clauses appeared.
171
166. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 469 (2015).
167. See Michael Addady, This Controversial Business Practice May Soon be Outlawed, FORTUNE
(Sept. 13, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/09/13/consumer-review-fairness-act! (reviewing the pur-
ported need for such legislation).
168. See Lucille M. Ponte, Protecting Brand Image or Gaming the System? Consumer "Gag" Con-
tracts in an Age of Crowdsourced Ratings and Reviews, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REv. 59, 67 (2016)
("[A] nondisparagement clause prevents consumers from making or posting any negative remarks,
criticisms, or ridicule about a business, its goods, and/or its services.").
169. See, e.g., Order Entering Default Judgment, Palmer v. KlearGear.com, No. 1: 13-cv-00175 (D.
Utah 2014), https://www.scribd.com/document/224430518/Palmer-v-Kleargear-Default-Judgment
(involving a suit in which the plaintiff seller attempted to sue a consumer for $3,500 in liquidated
damages for posting a negative review); see also Lee v. Makhnevich, No. 11 Civ. 8665(PAC), 2013
WL 1234829, at *1 (S.D. N.Y. March 27, 2013) (implicating a nondisparagement clause used in the
employment of a dentist's services); Jamie Herzlich, New Law Prevents Firms from Punishing
Consumers for Bad Reviews, NEWSDAY (Feb. 12, 2017, 9:07 AM), http://www.newsday.com/busin
ess/columnists/j amie-herzlich/new-law-prevents-firms-from-punishing-consumers-for-bad-reviews-
1.13084375 (quoting Professor Eric Goldman from Santa Clara University School of Law, who insists
that nondisparagement clauses are not "overly prevalent," but concedes that the clauses are (or were)
"utilized by some businesses"). For a complete discussion of nondisparagement clauses in the
consumer context, see Ponte, supra note 168, at 59, which "examines the rise of consumer
nondisparagement clauses and considers the legality of such agreements under contract, free speech,
and intellectual property principles."
170. Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-258, 130 Stat. 1355 (to be codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. 45b); see also Herzlich, supra note 169 (discussing the new law and attempt-
ing to delineate between disparagement and defamation).
171. See infra Part III.
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III. A STUDY OF THE LARGEST RETAILERS
Considering the ease with which retailers can attach terms and conditions
to online purchases of goods via clickwrap, browsewrap, or sign-in wrap
terms, it is not surprising that a number of retailers have started using these
devices of contract law to govern a number of aspects of consumer sales. 72
While most consumers would not be surprised to learn that online retailers
have return policies, they might be shocked to learn that the goods come with
disclaimers of warranties, limitations on liabilities, and sometimes arbitration
clauses. 173  One would not typically find these clauses in a brick-and-mortar
store, absent special conditions (such as with refurbished goods). 174 Nonethe-
less, such terms are becoming a common part of the online retail industry,
175
and the remainder of this article describes just how prolific they have already
become.
176
A. Scope of Study
Rather than explore the terms and conditions of every online merchant of
goods in the United States, this study focuses on the largest retailers, as judged
by sales. 177 The study group is limited to retailers that appear on the 2014,
2015, or 2016 list of top retailers, as ranked by the National Retail Federation
based on domestic retail sales in dollars.' 78  If a retailer appears on any of
172. See generally Kaustuv M. Das, Forum-Selection Clauses in Consumer Clickwrap and Browse-
wrap Agreements and the "Reasonably Communicated" Test, 77 WASH. L. REv. 481 (2002) (discuss-
ing how companies are using clickwrap and browsewrap to add forum-selection clauses to their agree-
ments).
173. See Terms and Conditions for Ecommerce Stores, TERMSFEED (Oct. 23, 2016), https://termsfe
ed.com/blog/terms-conditions-ecommerce-stores/.
174. The typical legal clauses available at a brick-and-mortar store are return policies and product
warranties. See Before You Shop, USA.GOV, https://www.use.gov/before-you-shop (last updated June
21, 2017) (laying out typical policies that consumers should be aware of when shopping). If a brick-
and-mortar store uses any disclaimers or limitations, they must be conspicuous to the consumer. See
Businessperson's Guide to Federal Warranty Law, FED. TRADE COMM'N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/business-center/guidance/businesspersons-guide-federal-warranty-law (last updated Dec.
2006) (laying out the protocol that stores must follow when disclaiming or limiting any warranties).
175. See infra Section III.C.
176. See infra Sections III.A-C.
177. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
178. See Kantar Retail, STORES Top Retailers 2016, NAT'L RETAIL FED., https:Hnrf.com/resource
s/annual-retailer-lists/top-100-retailers/stores-top-retailers-2016 (last visited Oct. 20, 2017); Kantar
Retail, Top 100 Retailers Chart 2015, NAT'L RETAIL FED., https:Hnrf.com/2015/topl00-table (last
visited Oct. 20, 2017); Kantar Retail, Top 100 Retailers Chart 2014, NAT'L RETAIL FED.,
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these lists, it is included in the study.
179
Several retailers have subsidiaries that run independent websites. 80 For
instance, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Pizza Hut, and Taco Bell are subsidiaries
of YUM! Brands. 8' As the goal of this study is to examine the online terms
and conditions of various merchants' websites, in such instances each subsid-
iary website is studied and counted separately.1
8 2
This study examined 154 retailers, including retailers that appear on the
National Retail Federation's 2014, 2015, or 2016 list, as well as any subsidi-
aries.' 8 3 The field was then narrowed to include only retailers that actually
sold goods online.' 84 Some retailers either did not sell goods online or sold
only gift cards online.'8 5 Those retailers were excluded from the survey.
18 6
However, merchants that permitted orders to be placed online with an option
for in-store pick up or delivery were not excluded.1 7 This includes merchants
in the food service industry that permit online orders."' Once the field was
narrowed, 113 merchants remained. 89
B. Methodology
The standard online terms and conditions of the 113 retailers included in
the study were examined and compared with the retailers' in-store policies,
https:Hnrf.com/2014/top 100-table (last visited Oct. 20, 2017).
179. Colin P. Marks, Data Collection of Frequency of Standard Online Terms of Major U.S. Retail-
ers (Mar. 15, 2017) (unpublished data collection) (on file with author).
180. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
181. See Our Brands, YUM BRANDS, http://www.yum.com/brands/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2017).




186. For the purposes of this study, gift cards were deemed not to be included in the U.C.C. defini-
tion of "goods." See U.C.C. § 2-314 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2012) (defining
"goods"). For a discussion of whether gift cards should qualify as goods, see Eniola Akindemowo,
Contract, Deposit or E-Value? Reconsidering Stored Value Products for a Modernized Payments
Framework, 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 275, 302-06 (2009), in which the author posits that, because
gift cards are goods-services hybrids, their classification as either goods or services should depend on
their predominant purpose or the gravamen of the dispute arising from the transaction.
187. Marks, supra note 179.
188. Id.
189. See Appendix A. The list was originally 115 but two of the retailers were removed-one due
to bankruptcy (A&P) and another ceased maintaining separate sales from its parent company (The
White Barn Company now part of Bath & Body Works, which was also a part of the dataset).
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including whether similar terms and conditions were posted in the stores
themselves. 90 The retailers were further broken down, by industry, into the
following categories: clothing (e.g., Ann Taylor), consumer electronics (e.g.,
Best Buy), food service (e.g., Pizza Hut), grocers (e.g., H-E-B), general mer-
chandise (e.g., Walmart), home and garden (e.g., Home Depot), office prod-
ucts (e.g., Office Max), and a general "other" category for any retailer that did
not fit into one of the previous seven categories.' 9' A second classification
was also made as to whether the retailer played a significant role in the man-
ufacture of the final product (such as with Apple and many retailers in the
food service industry).
19 2
As an initial matter, it was determined how retailers were contractually
binding their consumers, i.e. via browsewrap, clickwrap, scrollwrap, or sign-
in wrap.'9 3 Next, each retailer's terms and conditions were reviewed to look
for the presence of clauses that disclaim implied warranties, specifically dis-
claim warranties as to the use of the website, limit liability (including limiting
consequential damages), require arbitration, and whether there was a return
policy articulated.' 94 Furthermore, warranty disclaimers were coded to reflect
whether they were conspicuous, as defined under the U.C.C.,19 5 and whether
the language was clear enough to reach the products sold.' 96 Additional cod-
ing was conducted for the presence of clauses that limit the users' statute of
limitations, choice of law provisions, forum selection clauses, class actions
waivers, jury waivers, and nondisparagement clauses.1
9 7
With respect to coding for warranty disclaimers, some retailers did not
190. Marks, supra note 179. This was accomplished by assuming that each national retailer main-
tained uniform in-store policies and then traveling to the store and observing whether any additional
terms and conditions were posted there. Id. When it was not possible to travel to a retailer's local
branch, a phone call was made to a branch store in another location to inquire whether additional terms
and conditions were posted. Id. Though some stores maintained special shelves or areas containing
returned or refurbished goods that were sold with disclaimers, such special areas did not count as being
equivalent to the types of terms and conditions found online, because they did not apply store-wide.
Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. This second classification is meant to help determine, among other things, if downstream
liability correlates to the presence of certain terms and conditions.
193. Id.
194. Id.; see discussion supra Section II.B.
195. U.C.C. § 1-201 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2012) (defining conspicuous); see also
discussion supra Section II.B.3.
196. Marks, supra note 179; see discussion supra Section II.C.
197. Marks, supra note 179.
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use the words "goods" or "products," but instead used words such as "mate-
rials" or "contents."' 98 For instance, the Apple Store/iTunes terms and con-
ditions provides in part the following:
THE SITE AND ITS CONTENT ARE DELIVERED ON AN "AS-
IS" AND "AS-AVAILABLE" BASIS. ALL INFORMATION
PROVIDED ON THE SITE IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT
NOTICE. APPLE CANNOT ENSURE THAT ANY FILES OR
OTHER DATA YOU DOWNLOAD FROM THE SITE WILL BE
FREE OF VIRUSES OR CONTAMINATION OR DESTRUCTIVE
FEATURES. APPLE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES,
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING ANY WARRANTIES OF
ACCURACY, NON-INFRINGEMENT, MERCHANTABILITY
AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.'99
Arguably, the disclaimer is aimed only at problems encountered with the web-
site itself 2 ° Definitions of the word content include "[s]omething contained
198. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
199. Apple Website Terms of Use, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/legal/intemet-services/terms/site.
htIl (last updated Nov. 20, 2009). Of note, in another part of the Apple website, different from the
page on which the above disclaimer is found, Apple describes the warranties that come with its
products-such as iPhones and iPads-and much more clearly states that it disclaims the implied
warranties:
WARRANTY LIMITATIONS SUBJECT TO CONSUMER LAW
TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW, THIS WARRANTY AND THE REMEDIES
SET FORTH ARE EXCLUSIVE AND IN LIEU OF ALL OTHER WARRANTIES,
REMEDIES AND CONDITIONS, WHETHER ORAL, WRITTEN, STATUTORY,
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED. APPLE DISCLAIMS ALL STATUTORY AND IMPLIED
WARRANTIES, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
WARRANTIES AGAINST HIDDEN OR LATENT DEFECTS, TO THE EXTENT
PERMITTED BY LAW. IN SO FAR AS SUCH WARRANTIES CANNOT BE
DISCLAIMED, APPLE LIMITS THE DURATION AND REMEDIES OF SUCH
WARRANTIES TO THE DURATION OF THIS EXPRESS WARRANTY AND, AT
APPLE'S OPTION, THE REPAIR OR REPLACEMENT SERVICES DESCRIBED
BELOW. SOME STATES (COUNTRIES AND PROVINCES) DO NOT ALLOW
LIMITATIONS ON HOW LONG AN IMPLIED WARRANTY (OR CONDITION) MAY
LAST, SO THE LIMITATION DESCRIBED ABOVE MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU.
Apple One (1) Year Limited Warranty, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/legal/warranty/products/ios-
warranty-document-us.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2016). Though Apple eventually addresses the
warranties more clearly, this part of its website is not readily apparent when visiting its homepage.
See APPLE, https://www.apple.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2017).
200. See Apple Website Terms of Use, supra note 199. In addition to the page's title-Apple Web-
site Terms of Use-the word "site" is included in the terms three times, indicating a specific focus on
[Vol. 45: 1, 2017] Online and 'As Is"
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
in a receptacle,"2 0 ' and "something contained-usually used in plural. 20 2 But
other definitions include "[s]ubject matter, as of a written work, ' 203 "the topics
or matter treated in a written work,' 204 and "the principal substance (such as
written matter, illustrations, or music) offered by a website."
20 5
The word materials is similarly ambiguous. 206 For instance, consider the
following language used on the Belk website:
Disclaimer. Users assume all responsibility and risk for the use of
[Belk, belk.com, Belk tablet and smartphone apps ("Platforms")] and
the Internet generally. All information and materials provided on the
Platforms are provided "as is," without any express or implied war-
ranty of any kind, including, without limitation, warranties of mer-
chantability, fitness for a particular purpose and noninfringement of
intellectual property.... In no event will Belk be liable for any dam-
ages whatsoever (including, without limitation, any special, indirect
or consequential damages or damages resulting from loss of use of
data, or profits, or business interruption) arising out of the use of or
inability to use the content of the Platforms or any website linked
thereto, even if Belk has been advised of the possibility of such dam-
ages. Belk does not warrant the accuracy or completeness of the in-
formation, text, graphics, links, and other items contained on the Plat-
forms .... Warranty information regarding any products offered for
sale on the Platforms is available through the vendor/manufacturer
that made the product. Please contact the vendor/manufacturer for
any questions or concerns. Thank you.
20 7
The website's disclaimer appears to be geared toward the information on
the website itself. See id.
201. Content, THE AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY 151 (2d College ed. 1983) [hereinafter Content
(Am. Heritage)].
202. Content, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/con
tent (last visited Sept. 16, 2017) (giving examples, such as "the jar's contents"' and "the drawer's
contents") [hereinafter Content (Merriam-Webster)].
203. Content (Am. Heritage), supra note 201.
204. Content (Merriam-Webster), supra note 202 (giving, as an example, "table of contents"').
205. Id.
206. See infra notes 207-14 and accompanying text.
207. Terms of Use, BELK, http://www.belk.com/AST/Misc/Belk Stores/Customer Service/Policie
s Guidelines/Terms of Use.jsp (last updated Aug. 12, 2017).
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the website, rather than the products, but the word "materials" is ambigu-
ous. 2 8 Definitions of material include: "the elements, constituents, or sub-
stances of which something is composed or can be made"20 9 and "relating to,
derived from, or consisting of matter." 210 Though all these definitions could
refer to a purchased item, they are an ill-fit with reference to many products.21
But other definitions seem more consistent with the intangible nature of the
information found on websites. 21 2 For instance, two definitions of material-
"(in sing. or pl.) information, etc., to be used in writing a book, etc., 213 and
"something (such as data) that may be worked into a more finished form"
'214 -
seem to indicate that the warranty disclaimers are to be read as referring to the
information, as opposed to the products sold on the website.
2 15
Complicating this analysis is the fact that most website disclaimer clauses
studied, including the two listed above, follow the "contents" and "materials"
lines with specific mention of disclaiming "merchantability" and "fitness for
a particular purpose. "216 As noted, one effective way of disclaiming these two
implied warranties is doing so specifically.2 17 Given that the only way such
implied warranties normally arise is through the sale of goods under Article 2
of the U.C.C., it might be fair to infer that this language is being used to dis-
claim those warranties with regard to sales of goods on a website. 218 Indeed,
at least one court has adopted this approach.2 19
In Orthoflex, Inc. v. ThermoTek, Inc., the plaintiffs sued ThermoTek for
208. See id. (using phrases such as "damages... arising out of the inability to use the content of the
Platforms or any website linked thereto"). Further, note that the Belk website disclaimer was not in
all caps, see id., nor does it otherwise appear to satisfy the U.C.C.'s definition of conspicuous, see
U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(10) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2012) (noting that capitalization and
contrasting fonts and colors make a term sufficiently conspicuous).
209. Material, THE AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY 488 (2d College ed. 1983).
210. Material, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/m
aterial (last visited Sept. 16, 2017) [hereinafter Material (Merriam- Webster)].
211. See infra notes 220-27 and accompanying text.
212. See infra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
213. Material, OXFORD DESK DICTIONARY & THESAURUS 510 (2d ed. 2002).
214. Material (Merriam-Webster), supra note 210.
215. See supra notes 199, 207 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 199, 207 and accompanying text; infra notes 224-46 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
218. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2012) (stating that "a warranty
that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract") (emphasis added); see also id. § 2-315
(setting forth the conditions from which an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arises).
219. See infra notes 220-227 and accompanying text.
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breach of express and implied warranties in their purchases of Thernotek's
VascuTherm System and wraps, which together transferred "pressure, heat,
and cold to various body parts during medical therapy., 22 ThermoTek moved
to dismiss the implied warranty claims under the U.C.C., claiming that it had
properly disclaimed such warranties under Texas Business & Commercial
Code, section 2.316.221 Though the product was not purchased online, Ther-
moTek used disclaimer language in its sales agreement and user manual that
is similar to the language referenced in the Apple and Belk disclaimers:
THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS DOCUMENT IS
PROVIDED "AS IS", THERMOTEK EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS
ALL INFORMATION INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
EXPRESS AND IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE, OR
NON-INFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT WILL THERMOTEK
BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, SPECIAL,
INCIDENTAL, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES,
INCLUDING LOST PROFITS, LOST BUSINESS OR LOST
DATA, RESULTING FROM THE USE OF OR RELIANCE UPON
THE INFORMATION, WHETHER OR NOT THERMOTEK HAS
BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
DAMAGES.22 2
Plaintiffs claimed that the reference to "information" limited the dis-
claimer, including the disclaimers of merchantability and fitness for a partic-
ular purpose, to the information and not to the products themselves. 223 The
court, however, found that the language reached the products at issue, reason-
ing that there are no implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a par-
ticular purpose that apply to information, and that such implied warranties
only apply to goods. 224 The court posited:
220. Orthoflex, Inc. v. Thermotek, Inc., Nos. 3:11-CV-0870-D, 3:10-CV-2618-D, 2013 WL
4045206, at *1-3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2013).
221. Id. at *2-3. Texas Business & Commercial Code, section 2.316, is Texas's enactment of
U.C.C., section 2-316. See TEx. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316 (West, through the end of the 2017
Reg. and First Called Sess. of the 85th Legis.).
222. Orthoflex, Inc., 2013 WL 4045206, at *3.
223. Id. at*3-4.
224. Id. at *4.
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Reading the disclaimers to disclaim only warranties pertaining to "in-
formation" would in context make the disclaimers meaningless. By
specifically mentioning certain warranties and using the term "AS
IS"-which indicates the disclaimer of implied warranties-it is un-
mistakable that ThermoTek intended to disclaim all implied warran-
ties. And the only such warranties that could be implied would apply
to the products ThermoTek was selling.
225
The court did note, however, that the disclaimers were found in the part of the
document concerning warranties for the products themselves. 226 Though this
helped bolster the conclusion that the disclaimer was meant to reach the prod-
ucts, the court's reasoning casts some doubt on whether an argument similar
to the plaintiffs' in Orthoflex would be convincing if words such as "contents"
and "materials" were used in conjunction with "as is" clauses, disclaimers of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, or both.2 2 7
The purpose of this article is not to resolve this issue but to report on the
frequency with which certain clauses are used.2 28 To that end, three categories
were established: (1) merchants that clearly disclaimed all implied warranties
with regard to the products sold online; (2) merchants that did not use lan-
guage sufficient to reach the implied warranties for products; and (3) an "ar-
guable" category. 229 Merchants that used clear language-by, for example,
mentioning "products" or "merchandise" in conjunction with "as is" type
statements-express disclaimers of merchantability and fitness for a particu-
lar purpose, or both, were put into the first category.230 Merchants that failed
to mention the implied warranties by name and did not use "as is" clauses, or
limited the "as is" clause to the information on the page, were put in the second
category.23' Merchants that used language such as "contents" and "materials"
in conjunction with "as is" type clauses, explicit disclaimers of merchantabil-
ity and fitness for a particular purpose, or both, were placed in the third cate-
gory.232
225. Id. (footnote omitted).
226. Id.
227. See id.
228. See infra Section III.C.
229. Marks, supra note 179; see also infra Tables 2.1, 2.2.
230. Marks, supra note 179.
231. Id.
232. Id. Classification did not consider whether the clauses were conspicuous-that was coded
separately. Id.
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Merchants were categorized in two ways to help determine whether cer-
tain kinds of merchants used certain kinds of clauses more or less often.
233
First, merchants that manufactured the goods they sold were given a different
designation than pure retailers. 234 Food service merchants, for example, were
designated "manufacturers," as were traditional manufacturers, such as Apple,
that sell goods directly to consumers.235 Second, each merchant was placed
into one of the following industry categories: clothing, consumer electronics,
food service, grocers, general merchandise, home and garden, office products,
and "other. '236 Industry categorization was determined by how a merchant
marketed itself, without regard to whether the merchant sold items that could
fit into a different category. 237 For instance, H-E-B was categorized as a gro-
cer, 238 even though it also sells some electronics and clothing, 239 because it
markets itself as a general grocer.240
C. Results
1. Overall Results by Category
a. Form ofAssent
As Table 1.1 demonstrates, the vast majority of retailers rely on browse-
wrap agreements to bind consumers, although sign-in wrap agreements are
also somewhat prolific.
241
233. See infra notes 235-43 and accompanying text.




238. Marks, supra note 179.
239. See Entertainment and Electronics, H-E-B, https://www.heb.com/category/shop/entertainmen
t-and-electronics/2867 (last visited Oct. 22, 2017); Clothing, H-E-B, https://www.heb.com/category/s
hop/clothing/2866 (last visited Oct. 22, 2017).
240. See About Us, H-E-B, https://www.heb.com/static-page/About-Us (last visited Oct. 22, 2017)
("H- E- B is one of the largest independent food retailers in the nation.").
241. See infra Table 1.1; Marks, supra note 179.
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Table 1.1
Browsewrap Clickwrap Scrollwrap Sign-in Wrap
82/113 (72%) 4/113 (4%) 0/113 (0%) 27/113 (24%)
Given the deficiencies of browsewrap agreements, one would think that
online vendors would use clickwrap agreements more often. But, interest-
ingly, in a 2008 study of 500 online retailers, 88% were still using pure
browsewrap as the means of manifesting assent.242 Although browsewrap still
dominates, the trend, at least with regard to sellers of goods, appears to be
moving toward sign-in wrap, 2 43 while clickwrap and scrollwrap are rarely
used.244
b. Warranty disclaimers
As seen in Table 2.1 below, of the 113 retailers studied, the majority
(85%) use some form of implied warranty disclaimer.245 As seen in Table 2.2,
of the ninety-six retailers that used implied warranty disclaimers, 57% (49%
of all studied) were classified as "arguable. 24 6 Interestingly, except in the
case of refurbished or display items, none of the retailers had a similar implied
warranty disclaimer posted in their stores.24 This was also true of the other
clauses discussed below, except for return policies.
248
Table 2.1
Some Form of Implied Warranty Disclaimer 96/113 (85%)
No Implied Warranty Disclaimer 17/113 (15%)
242. Mann & Siebeneicher, supra note 12, at 998. Mann and Siebeneicher did not further delineate
forms of assent into sign-in wrap and scrollwrap agreements. See id. at 995-96 (describing the study's
methodology). It is therefore possible that some of the websites categorized as "browsewrap" in that
study could have qualified as sign-in wrap. See id. at 990 (noting that, "although too simple in the real
world" and despite numerous "variations" within the categories, the websites were categorized only
as browsewrap or clickwrap).
243. See supra Table 1.1; Marks, supra note 179.
244. See supra Table 1.1; Marks, supra note 179.
245. See infra Table 2.1; Marks, supra note 179.
246. See infra Table 2.2; Marks, supra note 179. Apart from classifying the clauses as either clearly
disclaiming warranties or being "arguable," the online terms and conditions were also studied for con-
spicuousness of the warranty disclaimers. See Marks, supra note 179. Only six of the studied retailers
used disclaimers that could arguably be classified as inconspicuous under Article 2. See id.
247. See infra Tables 2.1, 2.2; Marks, supra note 179.
248. See discussion infra Section III.C.1.c.
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Table 2.2
Clear Warranty Disclaimer 41/96 (43%)
Arguable Warranty Disclaimer 55/96 (57%)
c. Remaining Categories
Table 3.1 shows the frequency of the following categories: disclaimers of
warranties as to the use of the website, clauses limiting liability, arbitration
clauses, return policies, clauses shortening the statute of limitations, choice of




Use of Website 102/113 (90%)
Limitation of Liability 106/113 (94%)
Arbitration 40/113 (35%)
Return Policy 82/113 (73%)
Alteration of Statute of Limitations 16/113 (14%)
Choice of Law 91/113 (81%)
Forum Selection 64/113 (57%)
Jury Waiver 38/113 (34%)
Class Action Waiver 38/113 (34%)
Nondisparagement 2/113 (2%)
Further categorizing retailers by implied warranty disclaimer, as shown
in Table 3.2, reveals that retailers that use implied warranty disclaimers are
more likely to include other clauses as well.
250
249. See infra Table 3.1; Marks, supra note 179. An in-store terms-and-conditions category was
deleted from the table because no retailer provided such disclaimers. Marks, supra note 179.
250. See infra Table 3.2; Marks, supra note 179.
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Table 3.2
Disclaimer/Clause Implied Warranty No Implied
Waiver (Percentage) Warranty Waiver
(Percentage)
Use of website 92/96 (95%) 10/17 (59%)
Limitation of Liability 96/96 (100%) 10/17 (59%)
Arbitration 35/96 (36%) 5/17 (29%)
Return Policy 69/96 (72%) 13/17 (76%)
Alteration of Statute of 15/96 (16%) 1/17 (6%)
Limitations
Choice of Law 80/96 (83%) 11/17 (65%)
Forum Selection 57/96 (59%) 7/17 (41%)
Jury Waiver 33/96 (34%) 5/17 (29%)
Class Action Waiver 32/96 (33%) 6/17 (35%)
Nondisparagement 2/96 (2%) 0/17 (0%)
A few numbers stand out.2 5 1 First, most online retailers make some at-
tempt to disclaim any warranties relating to the use of their websites. 252 Fre-
quently, these disclaimers mention the accuracy of the site's information or
the inability of a user to access the site. 253  Second, it is clear that the vast
majority of online retailers use limited liability clauses to reign in damages
that would result from a successful lawsuit.254 These clauses were even more
prevalent than implied warranty waivers.255 Third, despite using "as is" type
clauses to limit warranties, most retailers-sixty-nine of the ninety-six (72%)
that employed an implied warranty waiver-are still willing to accept returns
of their merchandise within a specific time period. 256 While this may seem at
odds with the warranty disclaimers, these time periods are usually far more
limiting than the four-year statute of limitations provided under the U. C. C.,257
251. See infra notes 252-58 and accompanying text.
252. See supra Table 3.1, 3.2; Marks, supra note 179.
253. Marks, supra note 179.
254. See supra Tables 3.1, 3.2 (reporting that 106 of the 113 retailers studied (94%) included in
their terms and conditions a clause limiting liability); Marks, supra note 179.
255. Compare supra Table 2.1 (showing that ninety-six retailers employed some type of implied
warranty waiver), with supra Table 3.2 (showing that 106 retailers employed limited liability clauses);
Marks, supra note 179.
256. See supra Table 3.2; Marks, supra note 179.
257. See U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2012) ("An action for breach
[Vol. 45: 1, 2017] Online and 'As Is"
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
which was altered by only fifteen of the ninety-six (16%) retailers using "as
is" types of clauses.258 Thus, without a breach of warranty claim, a consumer
might have no cause of action against a retailer, though this could depend on
the nature of the injury.
2 59
While the warranty and liability disclaimer numbers may be expected, the
dearth of arbitration clauses is somewhat surprising.26 Arbitration is fre-
quently viewed as a pro-business form of dispute resolution that minimizes
litigation costs. 2 6 1 Furthermore, the Supreme Court's FAA jurisprudence has
of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued.").
258. See supra Table 3.2; Marks, supra note 179.
259. See U.C.C. § 2-316. Such clauses are generally ineffective against personal injury product
liability claims. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 18 (AM. LAW. INST. 1998)
("Disclaimers and limitations of remedies by product sellers or other distributors, waivers by product
purchasers, and other similar contractual exculpations, oral or written, do not bar or reduce otherwise
valid products-liability claims against sellers or other distributors of new products for harm to per-
sons."). This is true even in the presence of a contractually agreed upon waiver or limitation, such as
"[i]t is presumed that the ordinary product user or consumer lacks sufficient information and bargain-
ing power to execute a fair contractual limitation of rights to recover." Id. § 18 cmt. a. Comment d to
that same section makes an exception for informed consumers represented by powerful bargaining
allies. Id. § 18 cmt. d. Some states have altered this result to protect retailers that are not manufac-
turers. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,181 (2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-9 (Westlaw
through 2017 Reg. and Spec. Sess. Laws, Exec. Order 17-2, and Supreme Court Rule 17-11). Other
states with such statutes premise their exemption upon there being jurisdiction over the manufacturer.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 7001 (LEXIS through 81 Del. Laws, ch. 179); IDAHO CODE § 6-
1407 (LEXIS through the 2017 Legis. Sess.); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-621(a)-(c) (2017); IOWA
CODE § 613.18 (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3306 (West, Westlaw through laws effective on or
before July 1, 2017, enacted during the 2017 Reg. Sess. of the Kansas Legis.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 411.340 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2017 reg. sess.); MINN. STAT. § 544.41 (2017); MO.
REV. STAT. § 537.762 (2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-2 (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2017-56 of the
2017 Reg. Sess., but not including Sess. Laws 2017-6 or corrections and changes made by the Revisor
of Statutes); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.78 (LexisNexis, LEXIS with Legis. passed by the 132nd
General Assemb. and filed with the Secretary of State through file 17 (HB 103) with the exception of
file 14 (HB 49)); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-106 (LEXIS through 2017 Reg. Sess. (Ch. 493)); WASH.
REV. CODE § 7.72.040 (2017).
260. See supra Table 3.1 (noting that only forty of the 113 (35%) retailers included in the study
used an arbitration clause in their terms and conditions); see generally Mark Fellows, The Same Result
as in Court, More Efficiently: Comparing Arbitration and Court Litigation Outcomes,
METROPOLITAN. CORP. COUNS., July 2006, at 32 (describing how arbitrations are more efficient with
respect to time and money).
261. See Jean R. Stemlight, In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration (if Imposed on the Company), 8
NEV. L.J. 82, 83 (2008) (stating that defenders of mandatory arbitration clauses typically claim that
"arbitration is quicker and cheaper than litigation and overall just as fair or fairer," an assertion Pro-
fessor Stemlight patently rejects). Andrew Pincus, a partner at a Washington firm and the attorney
who argued on behalf of AT&T Mobility LLC in the landmark case, refutes the plaintiff bar's calling
the Supreme Court "pro-business" and highlights pro-consumer provisions in the contract at issue in
that case. See Andrew Pincus, The Advantages ofArbitration, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 24,2012,
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clearly favored enforcement of arbitration clauses.262
In light of the Supreme Court's complicity in enforcing arbitration
clauses 263 and the benefits arbitration bestows upon businesses such as retail-
ers,264 the absence of arbitration clauses in so many terms and conditions is
striking. 26 5  It could be that retailers believe existing warranty and liability
disclaimers are sufficient, or perhaps retailers are simply unconcerned with
the prospect of a traditional courtroom setting. 266 Their absence could merely
be an oversight.267 If that is the case, then it would not be surprising to see
this number increase in coming years.268 Indeed, some retailers that were
1:44 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/24/the-advantages-of-arbitration ("AT&T's contract
with its wireless customers had special pro-consumer provisions; AT&T agreed to pay all of the
arbitration fees for small claims, and to provide special bonuses, including double lawyers' fees, if a
claimant recovered an amount greater than AT&T's settlement offer.").
262. See Jean R. Stemlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for
Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Con-
cerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 18 (1997) ("While a federal policy 'favoring arbitration' might conceivably
mean a policy that looked upon arbitration with favor, rather than a policy that favored arbitration over
litigation, the Court made it clear that it was endorsing the latter use of the term 'favor.' Specifically,
it explicitly proclaimed that any doubts as to whether an ambiguous contract called for arbitration over
litigation 'should be resolved in favor of arbitration."' (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 (1983)).
263. See Stemlight, supra note 262, at 18.
264. The arbitration alternative to litigation provides benefits to businesses, such as speed, cost, and
expert decision makers. See Fellows, supra note 260, at 32 (comparing the outcomes and timeframes
of arbitration and litigation and concluding that while the substantive outcomes are similar, arbitration
is quicker and its cost is "very reasonable"). But see Stephen J. Ware, IsAdjudication a Public Good?
"Overcrowded Courts" and the Private Sector Alternative ofArbitration, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 899, 905-06 (2013) (analyzing the difference in cost subsidization between litigation and ar-
bitration and concluding that while litigation court costs are at least partially subsidized by tax dollars,
parties bear the full cost of arbitration).
265. See Mann & Siebeneicher, supra note 12, at 998, 1011.
266. See id. at 1011 (attributing the absence of arbitration clauses in retailers' terms and conditions
to two factors: "the desire to have terms that appear to be benign and the desire to have terms ... to
which consumers will accede in the event of a dispute").
267. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical
Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L.
REV. 335, 373 (2007) ("[L]arge corporate actors do not systematically embrace arbitration.").
268. See Nancy S. Kim & D.A. Jeremy Telman, Internet Giants as Quasi-GovernmentalActors and
the Limits of Contractual Consent, 80 MO. L. REV. 723, 734 (2015) (suggesting that although only
about one-third of the top websites incorporate rights-limiting terms in wrap agreements, "it will not
take long for other websites" to embrace such practices, in light of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
favoring these terms); Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking
the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 31, 2015) https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/
business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html ("Over the last few
years, it has become increasingly difficult to ... shop online without agreeing to private arbitration.").
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studied added arbitration clauses in the year prior to concluding this re-
search.269
It is also interesting to note that while arbitration clauses often include
other clauses-such as choice of law clauses, jury waivers, and class action
waivers-those clauses also appear in the standard terms and conditions of
websites that do not have arbitration clauses. 270 Table 3.3 shows the preva-
lence of the other clauses for retailers that also have arbitration clauses. 27 1 The
frequency of many of the clauses is similar to the frequency found in disclaim-
ers that do not use arbitration clauses.27 2
Table 3.3
Disclaimer/Clause Arbitration Clause No Arbitration
(number/total) Clause
(number/total)
Implied Warranty Dis- 35/40 (86%) 61/73 (84%)
claimer
Use of Website Disclaimer 40/40 (100%) 62/73 (85%)
Limitation of Liability 40/40 (100%) 66/73 (90%)
Return Policy 30/40 (75%) 52/73 (71%)
Alteration of Statute of 7/40 (18%) 9/73(12 %)
Limitations
Choice of Law 36/40 (90%) 55/73 (75%)
Forum Selection 23/40 (56%) 41/73 (56%)
Jury Waiver 33/40 (83%) 5/73 (7%)
Class Action Waiver 31/40 (78%) 7/73 (10%)
Nondisparagement 2/40 (5%) 0/73 (0 %)
Many of the similarities are understandable; for instance, choice of law
provisions are generally enforceable, give the seller some predictability in
how the terms of the contract will be interpreted, and are useful even if the
269. Marks, supra note 179. Those retailers include: Amazon, Baskin Robbins, Best Buy, CVS,
Farm Fresh Supermarkets, Gap, JC Penney, Jared, Kay, Maurice's, Meijer, Nordstrom's, Save Mart
Supermarkets, and Whole Foods. Id.
270. See infra Table 3.3 (comparing the prevalence of standard terms and conditions between web-
sites that employ arbitration clauses and those that do not) ; Marks, supra note 179.
271. See infra Table 3.3.
272. See infra Table 3.3.
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parties do not use arbitration.2 73 But jury and class action waivers, outside of
the context of arbitration, often get scrutinized as being either unconscionable
or against public policy. 2 74 The Supreme Court's prescriptive interpretations
of the FAA save such clauses when they are part of an arbitration provision.
275
Apparently, a few online vendors wish to avoid the ease and speed of arbitra-
tion-which arguably benefits consumers-but retain the right to avoid class
actions (10%) or jury trials (7%)276-which does not benefit consumers. 27 7 In
other words, these sellers want to have their cake and eat it too; but outside of
arbitration, the enforceability of such clauses is suspect. 2 78
2. Manufacturers Versus Retailers
As noted above, retailers (including food service retailers) were also
coded for whether they played a role in manufacturing the products sold on
their websites. 2 79 Table 4.1 shows the breakdown with regard only to the
273. See Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37 GA. L.
REv. 363, 366-7 (2003) (reporting that, based on a study of approximately 700 cases, choice of law
provisions "are enforced in all but certain narrow categories of cases").
274. See Gaylord Dep't Stores of Alabama, Inc. v. Stephens, 404 So. 2d 586, 588 (Ala. 1981)
("Courts upholding jury waivers follow a general rule that.., a waiver will be strictly construed.");
see also Leslie, supra note 158, at 277 (noting that some courts have held class action waivers uncon-
scionable and against public policy).
275. Muriithi v. Shuttle Exp., Inc., 712 F.3d 173, 180 (4th Cir. 2013) (distinguishing the holding in
Concepcion as prohibiting "application of the general contract defense of unconscionability" in at-
tempts "to invalidate" agreements to arbitrate in otherwise valid circumstances).
276. See supra Table 3.3 (noting that seven of seventy-three (10%) and five of seventy-three (7%)
retailers employed class action waivers and jury waivers, despite electing not to include an arbitration
clause in their terms and conditions); Marks, supra note 179.
277. See Leslie, supra note 158, at 275-81 (pointing to the nature of class action waivers as inher-
ently anti-consumer in that they foreclose small claim recovery due to eclipsing litigation costs); see
also In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821, 827 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999) ("The reality that the average consumer
frequently loses his/her constitutional rights and right of access to the court when he/she buys a car,
household appliance, insurance policy, receives medical attention or gets a job rises as a putrid odor
which is overwhelming to the body politic."); see generally Jean R. Stemlight, Mandatory Binding
Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to A Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP.
RESOL. 669 (2001) (arguing that mandatory arbitration clauses equate to jury trial waivers and dis-
cussing the harm consumers face as a result).
278. See Leslie, supra note 158, at 292 ("By holding that judges cannot use the unconscionability
doctrine to invalidate a term embedded in an arbitration agreement, Concepcion risks limiting the
ability of courts to hold other unconscionable contract terms unenforceable .... So long as a firm
inserts an otherwise unenforceable, unconscionable term in an arbitration agreement, Concepcion
could prevent lower courts from invalidating that unconscionable term.").
279. See supra Section III.B.
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Some Form of Implied 17/20 (85%) 79/93 (85%)
Warranty Disclaimer





Use of website 19/20 (95%) 83/93 (89%)
Limitation of Liability 20/20 (100%) 86/93 (92%)
Arbitration 7/20 (35%) 33/93 (35%)
Return Policy 8/20 (40%) 74/93 (80%)
Alteration of Statute of 5/20 (25%) 11/93 (12%)
Limitations
Choice of Law 17/20 (85%) 74/93 (80%)
Forum Selection 9/20 (45%) 55/93 (59%)
Jury Waiver 5/20 (25%) 33/93 (35%)
Class Action Waiver 5/20 (25%) 33/93 (35%)
Nondisparagement 0/20 (0%) 2/93 (2%)
There are few significant differences between manufacturers and non-
manufacturers. 2 2 Non-manufacturers are less likely to have clauses that alter
the statute of limitations, but are more likely to have forum selection clauses,
jury waivers, and class action waivers. 2 3 The biggest difference between
manufacturers and non-manufacturers is found in the return policy cate-
gory.284 This is most likely because sellers in the food service industry are
280. See infra Table 4.1; Marks, supra note 179.
281. See infra Table 4.2; Marks, supra note 179.
282. See supra Tables 4.1, 4.2; Marks, supra note 179.
283. See supra Table 4.2; Marks, supra note 179.
284. See supra Table 4.2 (reporting that only eight of twenty (40%) manufacturers specified a return




3. Breakdown by Industry
The retailers were further broken down by industry.28 6 Industries were
determined by reviewing the retailers' websites and the products that were
offered.287 The categories into which these are divided include: clothing, con-
sumer electronics, food services, general merchandise, grocers, home and gar-
den, office products, and "other., 288  Though many retailers offer products
that could be in multiple categories, determinations were made based on the
primary thrust of the business. 289 For instance, some grocers sell small con-
sumer electronics, and some home and garden retailers sell certain limited
kinds of clothing, but these are not the primary products that these businesses
sell. 290 Retailers-such as Walmart-that truly offer a full range of products,
were coded as "General Merchandise," and retailers that did not fit into any
of the specialized categories were placed in a catch-all category-"other."291
Table 5.1 shows the breakdown of the retailers by category.292
Table 5.1
Industry Percentage (number)
Clothing (Cl.) 16% (18/113)
Consumer Electronics (CE) 5% (6/113)
Food Service (FS) 15% (17/113)
General Merchandise (GM) 19% (21/113)
Grocers (Gr.) 21% (24/113)
Home and Garden (H&G) 10% (11/113)
policy, in contrast to seventy-four of ninety-three (80%) non-manufacturers); Marks, supra note 179.
285. See infra Section III.C.3.
286. See infra notes 287-99 and accompanying text.
287. Marks, supra note 179.
288. See infra Table 5.1; Marks, supra note 179.
289. Marks, supra note 179.
290. Compare, e.g., Workwear, Safety Gear, and Equipment, HOME DEPOT, http://www.homedepot
.com/b/Tools-Workwear-Safety-Gear-Equipment/N-5yclvZc4ow (last visited Oct. 22, 2017), with
See Our History, HOME DEPOT, https:Hcorporate.homedepot.com/about (last visited Oct. 22, 2017).
291. Marks, supra note 179. The retailers included in the "other" category were not numerous
enough to form their own category, but did neatly fit into the "other" category. Id. For instance, Toys
"R" Us was the only toy retailer in the study and so was placed in the "other" category. Id.
292. See infra Table 5.1; Marks, supra note 179.
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Office Products (OP) 2% (3/113)
Other 12% (13/113)
Table 5.2 displays the frequency with which each type of clause appeared
by industry.293
Table. 5.2
Disclaimer/clause CL CE FS GM Gr. H&G OP Other
Implie2d Warant 1318, 660 16/17 F 11 124 9)11 3/3' 11/13)
Discaime (2) (lOO')o) (940) (81 P) (88N-%) (N2T) (1001") (5o
Use ofWebsite 1518 66 1717 1921 2224 811 33 1213
(79°~4 f (100°/ l (100/.' (If°/4fl ((M
0
4°l (7-I °/ (100/.' (-
0
I °l
(39%) (33%) (35%) (430%) (38 ) (18%) (0%) (38%)
RetuniPoliy IN8/18 660 611 182 82N N4 1011 1 133 1313I -
(l0"o) ( 100" o) (350 ') o (8, 8, ) (3 3 (91i) 1 too") (1 00,)
Alteration of 0/18 1/6 9/17 1/21 0/24 2/11 1/3 2/13
Statute of (0%) (17%) (53%) (5%) (0%) (18%) (33%) (15%)
Limitations
Chot,:,: fLw I15/1I8 460 117 12 11) 924 6/1 1 33 1/1
(83%) (6 Uo) ( S") (8 1%) ( 9%)o (' 5V1) 1001) (929 )
Forum Selection 12018 16 10 17 11/21 13/24 6 11 33 8/13
(670o) (170o) (590%) (520) (5411 ) (550) (100) (620o)
Junyac N1 26 517 721 10124 1 11 0/ /13
(44) (3 I)(9% 30 (42%) (90)o (90l) N(8),o
Class Action 7/18 2/6 5/17 11/21 6/24 1/11 1/3 5/13
Waiver (39%) (33%) (29%) (52%) (25%) (9%) (33%) (38%)
Nonirmnt0 0/6 11 14
The frequencies found in several categories are similar across indus-
tries. 294 For instance, nondisparagement clauses are rarely used at all, while
limitation of liability clauses are used very frequently (between 89% and
100%) in every industry.295  Implied warranty disclaimers also appear fre-
quently, except in the clothing industry where only 72% of those studied in-
cluded such a disclaimer.296 This may have something to do with the nature
293. See infra Table 5.2; Marks, supra note 179.
294. See supra Table 5.2; Marks, supra note 179.
295. See supra Table 5.2; Marks, supra note 179.
296. See supra Table 5.2; Marks, supra note 179.
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of the goods as well as the high frequency of return policies (100% in the
clothing industry). 29 7 Return policy provisions appeared with high frequency
in all other industries as well, except for the food service (35%) and grocer
industries (33%) .298 Given the perishable nature of the goods in these two
industries (and the realty that the goods are often consumed soon after pur-
chase), the low frequency of return policies is not surprising.
2 9 9
IV. CONCLUSION
The online sale of goods is a booming industry that has increased the con-
venience with which consumers can shop. 00 The ease of simply clicking a
button to complete a purchase brings with it the concomitant ease with which
vendors can make their sales subject to additional terms and conditions.3O1
This article has explored some of the most common terms and conditions, but
it is worth noting that none of the stores studied attempted to make in-store
purchases subject to the same terms and conditions.30 2 Furthermore, the vast
majority of the websites studied used a form of assent-browsewrapgg-typ-
ically viewed as the least likely to make consumers aware of the terms and
conditions, and thus the most susceptible to attack.30 4 Meanwhile, the most
enforceable and conspicuous forms of assent, clickwrap and scrollwrap,30 5 are
barely used at all.30 6
These two revelations-the failure to use the same terms and conditions
297. Marks, supra note 179.
298. See supra Table 5.2; Marks, supra note 179.
299. See Christine Gallary, Kitchen Facts: What's Considered Perishable Food?, KITCHN (Aug. 21,
2015), http://www.thekitchn.com/whats-considered-perishable-food-222540. Furthermore, if goods
are non-conforming under sections 2-601 and 2-602 of the U.C.C., then the buyer has the right to reject
within a reasonable time after delivery. U.C.C. §§ 2-601, -602 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N
2012). The seller could then have the opportunity to cure. Id. § 2-508.
300. See Andrew Soergel, As Online Sales Boom, Is Brick-and-Mortar on the Way Out?, U.S. NEWS
&WORLD REPORT (Dec. 20, 2016, 12:46 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-12-20/wit
h-online-sales-booming-is-brick-and-mortar-on-the-way-out ("[P]roject[ed] total holiday sales will be
up a respectable 3.6 percent in 2016. But non-store sales are likely to grow at twice that pace-
between 7 and 10 percent. The percentage of consumers expected to shop online this holiday season,
56.5 percent, is almost identical to the percentage that will shop in department stores-56.6 percent.").
301. See supra Section II.A (discussing how online retailers contract with consumers).
302. See supra Sections III.B-C (discussing the study methods and findings).
303. See supra Section III.C.1.a (reporting findings).
304. See supra Section II.A (distinguishing types of online contracting techniques).
305. See supra Section II.A.
306. See supra Section III.C.1.a (reporting findings).
[Vol. 45: 1, 2017] Online and "As Is"
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
online and in the store, and the failure to use a more conspicuous form of
assent to terms-raise the question whether vendors are all that concerned
with the terms that they include on their websites.3 ° 7 Some terms, such as
stand-alone class action waivers that are not a part of an arbitration clause,
could be attacked as unconscionable and in violation of public policy.30 8
Other terms, such as disclaimers of implied warranties and liability limita-
tions, are of limited utility because they would likely be unenforceable in
cases involving personal injury.30 9 While this article has not deeply analyzed
the enforceability of all the terms that were studied, the above issues raise
questions as to why online vendors include them as part of their websites.31 °
307. See supra Section II.A.
308. See supra notes 261-74 and accompanying text (reviewing several contract terms which have
traditionally been viewed as pro-business and anti-consumer).
309. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text (providing analysis of consequential damages
limitations in personal injury cases).
310. See supra notes 307-09 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 45: 1, 2017] Online and "As Is"
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX A:
LIST OF RETAILERS STUDIED (IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER) 3 1 '
1. Ace Hardware
2. Advance Auto Parts
3. Albertsons
4. Amazon
5. Ann Taylor (Ascena Retail Group)
6. Apple Stores / iTunes
7. Applebee's (DineEquity)
8. Army Air Force Exchange
9. AT&T Wireless
10. AutoZone
11. Barnes & Noble
12. Baskin Robbins (Dunkin Brands)
13. Bath and Body Works (L Brands)




18. BJ's Wholesale Club
19. Burlington Coat Factory
20. Carrabbas (Bloomin' Brands)
21. Catherine's (Ascena Retail Group)
22. Chik-fil-A
23. Chili's (Brinker International)
24. C.O. Bigelow (L Brands)
25. Costco
26. Cub Foods (SUPERVALU)
27 CVS Caremark
28. Dell





311. A subsidiary's parent group is indicated in parentheticals.
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34. Dress Barn (Ascena Retail Group)
35. Dunkin Donuts (Dunkin Brands)




40. Giant (Ahold USA)
41. Giant Eagle
42. H-E-B




47. Ikea North America Services
48. J.C. Penney
49. Jared (Signet Jewelers)
50. Justice (Ascena Retail Group)
51. Kay (Signet Jewelers)
52. KFC (YUM! Brands)
53. K-Mart (Sears Holdings)
54. Kohl's
55. Kroger
56. La Senza (L Brands)
57. Lane Bryant (Ascena Retail Group)
58. Loft (Ascena Retail Group)
59. LongHorn Steakhouse (Darden)
60. Lou Grey (Ascena Retail Group)
61. Lowe's (Lowe's Companies)
62. Macy's
63. Maggiano's (Brinker International)
64. Maurices (Ascena Retail Group)




69. MyGofer (Sears Holdings) ONLINE w/ K-mart
70. Neiman Marcus
71. Nordstrom




74. Olive Garden (Darden Restaurants)
75. O'Reilly Automotive
76. Orchard Supply (Lowe's Companies)
77. Outback (Bloomin Brands)
78. Panera
79. Peapod (Ahold USA) ONLINE ONLY
80. Peoples (Signet Jewelers)
81. PetSmart
82. Piercing Pagoda (Signet Jewelers)
83. Pizza Hut (YUM! Brands)
84. Price Chopper Supermarkets
85. Publix
86. QVC (ONLINE ONLY)
87. Rite Aid
88. Safeway
89. Save Mart Supermarkets
90. Sears (Sears Holdings)
91. Shop 'n Save (SUPERVALU)




96. Stater Bros. Holdings
97. Stop and Shop (Ahold USA)
98. Subway
99. Taco Bell (YUM! BRANDS)
100. Target
101. The Home Depot
102. Toys "R"Us
103. Tractor Supply Co.
104. True Value
105. Verizon Wireless
106. Victoria's Secret (L Brands)
107. Walgreen
108. Wal-Mart
109. Wegmans Food Market
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110. Whole Foods Market
111. Williams-Sonoma
112. WinCo Foods
113. Zales (Signet Jewelers)
54
